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OUR PERFECT CONSTITUTION
HENRY P. MONAGHAN*
Projessor Monaghan takes isue with "duesubstance" theorists, who rietr the Constitution as protecting rights and values generated by current conceptions of political
morality. In this Article, he examines and criticizes the theories adcanced to jILstify
looking to those current conceptions as an acceptable mode of reasoning about
constitutional meaning. ProfessorAfonaghan's own clew is that the proper mode of
ascertaining constitutionalmeaning is one that looks to original intent and precedent, a view that acknowledges the Constitution does not guaranteeperfect gorcernment.
Our great and sacred Constitution, serene and inviolable, stretches its beneficent powers over
our land ...like the outstretched arm of God himself... the people of the United States...
ordained and established one Supreme Court- the most rational, considerate. discerning. veracious, impersonal power-the most candid, unaffected. conscientious. Incorruptible
power.... 0 Marvelous Constitutionl Magic Parchment! Transforming word! Mker. Moni.
tor,
Guardian of Manldnd!I
Every tribe needs its totem and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours.^
Indeed, Mr. Editor, the great fault of the present times is, in considering the
constitution as perfect .3

THE PERFECTIONIST CULTURE THFME

Some lawyers, many judges, and perhaps most academic commentators view the constitution as authorizing courts to nullif3 the
results of the political process on the basis of general principles of
political morality not derived from the constitutional text or the structure it creates. The supreme court is plainly committed to such an
endeavor in the sex-marriage-children area, where some fifty written
opinions order these relationships ostensibly in the name of securing
due process and equal protection. 4 Indeed, the court seems well on
its way to "constitutionalizing" the entire subject of family law, which
two short decades ago was bereft of constitutional restraints.5
*Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., 1955, University of Massaclusetts; LL.B.,
1958, Yale University; LL.M., 1960, Harvard University. 0 1981 by Henry P. Monaghan.
H. Estabrook, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Missouri Bar 278 (1913). quoted
in R. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought 402 (1940).
* Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937).
* S. Roane, Letter to the Editor of the [Richmond] Enquirer, June 18, 1819, reprinted in C.
Gunther, John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 130 (1969).
4 The figure is cited without authority for the years 1965 to 1980 in Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 625 (1980) [hereinafter Karst, Intimate Association].
5 For an elaborate and approving summary of this development, see Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1161-97, 1248-13M3 (19S0).
353

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:353

The court's efforts at developing a constitutional lex non scripta
are modest when compared with those of its admiring academic
commentators. For well over twenty years these commentators have
been industriously formulating substantive limits on the political
process in the name of equal protection of the laws." More recently,
these commentators have been "taking rights seriously"- so seriously
in fact that they outdo one another in urging the imposition of constitutional constraints on the basis of "rights" whose origins cannot be
traced to either the constitutional text or the structure it creates. The
current academic emphasis on rights, rather than equality, has two
sources: the general perception that concerns over political morality
are not exhausted by, and cannot be reduced to, concepts of equality; 7
and a more focused concern for according protection to those specified
areas of individual autonomy that are most highly esteemed by the
commentators. Thus, the commentators eagerly defend limitations on
government based upon the rights of "personhood," 8 "intimate association," and "personal lifestyles."' 10 Quite plainly, the old fear of
substantive due process is dead; it has been succeeded by a confidence
that "good" and "bad" varieties of substantive due process can be
distinguished. "
Some commentators would go still further. Mixing concepts of
rights and equality, they would hold government to an affirmative
constitutional duty to satisfy the "just wants" of its citizens.12 In their
view, government is constitutionally obliged to provide "adequate"

For more critical commentary, see Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev.
329.
, These limitations developed initially under the rubric of equal protection because egalitarian intuitions, however confused, underlay much of the Warren court's thinking about
political morality. Moreover, a general stench had enveloped the concept of substantive due
process. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 417 (1977)
[hereinafter Monaghan, Of "Liberty"].
7 See Stone, Equal Protection And The Search for Justice, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 5-8 (1980);
Stone, Justice in the Slough of Equality, 29 Hastings L.J. 995, 1008-18 (1978).
8 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law ch. 15 (1978) ("rights of privacy and per-

sonhood").
9 Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 4, at 629-52 ("freedom of Intimate association"),
10 Wilkinson

& White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 Cornell L. Roy,

563, 611-25 (1977) ("constitutional lifestyle right").
I Apparently this belief is shared by the court. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 502-06 (1977) (plurality opinion); note 175 infra.
12 Professor Michelman originally advanced this idea under the concept of equal protection,
while suggesting that substantive due process would have been a more appropriate vehicle.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term -Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the

Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 11-13, 16-18 (1969) [hereinafter Michelman,
Protecting the Poor].
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levels of food, housing, education, and whatever other "goods" the
commentators deem necessary to a decent existence.13
Academic commentary of this character is more than simply
intriguing. It vividly highlights a core issue in modern constitutional
theory- the legitimacy of judicial review under (in the characterization of a former student) the "due substance clauses": substantive due
process and substantive equal protection. Most commentators welcome "due substance" review in some form, proclaim that it is "here
to stay," 14 and admonish that further resistance is "unwise" and
"hopeless."'15 The fun, for them, begins in seeking to domesticate
their creations. Since the meaning of the constitution is not to be
found in its history or in judicial precedent, but in current social
consensus-or, as now seems the fashion, in Kant, Rawls, 16 or
Nozick 7 -the commentator's initial task is the selection of a preferred source from which to extract concepts of equality and justice.
Next, the substance of political activity is expressed and weighed in
scales, or even calibrated on charts.' 8 Finally, the commentator concludes, usually after the most meticulous and detailed comparison of
the "interests at stake," that certain political outcomes are simply
prohibited. No matter how "fair" or "open" the underlying political
process, these outcomes must be set aside because they conflict with
some ideal normative pattern "out there" that circumscribes the permissible distribution of governmental benefits or burdens. 9

13 See Michelman, States Rights and States" Roles: Permutations of -Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v.Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165, 1181-91 (1977) (resting case for wdlfare
rights on Usery); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls
Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962, 966, 997, 1018 (1973) (relying on J. Rawls, A Theory
of Justice (1971)) [hereinafter Michelman, One View of Rawls]. For criticism of this view, see
Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 117, 118-0 (1978)
[hereinafter Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard]. For a response, see Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 659, 674-80 (relying on Ely's
"representation-reinforcing" views) [hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights].
14 Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 4, at 665.
IsA. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113 (1976).
16 J.Bawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
7 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). For a recent attempt to analyze the
workings of the Warren and Burger courts in terms of Rawls and Nozick, see Nowak, Foreword:
Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 Hastings Const. L.Q. 263,
274-311 (1980). See also Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 13, at 6S0-S3; D. Richards, The
Moral Criteism of Law 44-56 (1977).
18 See Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 663, 681 (1977).
19For an astounding effort to apply this mode of analysis to a whole complex area of law, see
Developments in the Law- The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1193-97
(1980) ("flexible balancing").
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"Due substance" methodology is profoundly different from one
premised on a view that (in general) the constitution legitimately
sanctions inquiry only into the openness and fairness of the political
process. Professor Ely's process-oriented Democracy and Distrust20 is,
I think, the classic affirmation in our time for those recalcitrants who,
like me, oppose any further extension of an approach that tests political outcomes for their consistency with some external, ideal pattern of
distributive justice. 21 And since we recalcitrants are, as yet, unwilling to yield the battlefield, one can expect that this controversy will
22
occupy the center of constitutional debate for some time to come.
My concern here is with an aspect of the controversy that in this
context has escaped notice. Virtually every adherent to the "due substance" school of judicial review shares in whole or in large part a
critical culture theme, to borrow a phrase from cultural anthropology: that of "Our perfect Constitution."
The practice of "constitution worship" has been quite solidly
ingrained in our political culture from the beginning of our constitutional history.2 3 Initially, the constitution symbolized the unity of the
new nation.2 4 With the advent of national prosperity, "the exultation
over the new America was converted into the tradition of a perfect
constitution. '2 5 Not surprisingly, the Civil War placed considerable
strain on the perfection theme;26 but with the resurgence of nationalism at the war's conclusion, perfectionism took firm hold again. 7
A counterculture has always existed, of course. Before the Civil
War, for example, many abolitionists denounced the constitution for

J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). As will be apparent, however, Professor Ely's
approach shares premises with those of his opponents, particularly his general adherence to the
"two-clause theory." See note 61 infra.
2, I used the term "distributive justice" to include claims to "autonomy" as well as "equality." Like equality, autonomy is a value which the political order claims the power to regulate to
meet current social needs.
22

The commentary on Professor Ely's book is already voluminous. See Estreicher, Review

Essay, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 547, 547 n.4 (citing 12 works in addition to an entire symposium).
21

See 1 H. Hoist, Constitutional and Political History of the United States ch. 2 (J. Lalor &

A. Masun trans. 1889) ("The Worship of the Constitution and Its Real Character").
2' Lerner, supra note 2, at 1295.
'5 Id. at 1297; see Schechter, The Early History of the Tradition of the Constitution, 9 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 707, 716-34 (1915). But see R. Gabriel, supra note 1, at 19 (aruging that there
was no constitution worship before Sumter fell").
"6See H. Hyman, A More Perfect Union 99-140 (1973).
27 See Lerner, supra note 2, at 1303. Lerner noted that worship of the constitution was
frequently accompanied by adulation of the supreme court. Id. at 1308-10. Mr. Estabrook's

comment in the epigraph to this article is an illustration. The classic constitutional canonization
is former Solicitor General James Beck's The Constitution of the United States (1924). See C.
Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History 182 n.41 (1969).
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its recognition of slavery. The most salient modern challenge to the
perfect constitution came from progressive historians who attacked
the constitution (and the court) as an impediment to social change.2In essence, they saw the constitution as the American Thermidor to
the democracy of the Declaration of Independence.2 9 J. Allen Smith's
influential text, Spirit of American Government,30 epitomized this
view. Smith described his purpose as "call[ing) attention to the spirit
of the Constitution, its inherent opposition to democracy, the obstacles which it has placed in the way of majority rule..." and he
entitled a chapter "The Constitution As A Reactionary Document."32
But when the court began to sustain New Deal legislation, one consequence was to eliminate as a working theme of political and social
theory any concept of the constitution as a fundamentally undemocratic, let alone a thoroughly reactionary, document..3 3 This, in turn,
tended to deflect attention from any inadequacies in the document,
thereby indirectly reinforcing the culturally dominant symbolism of
the constitution as the embodiment of political justice as well as
national unity. 34
"Due substance" theorists would, of course, insist that they are
aware of this history, and that they neither worship the constitution
nor view it as perfect. Perhaps indignantly, they would observe that
they recognize that issues such as international peace, poverty, inflation, and crime control are not amenable to resolution simply by

28 Vernon Louis Parrington wrote that the "chief contribution of the Progressive movement
to American political thought was its discovery of the essentially undemocratic nature of the
federal constitution." Parrington, Introduction to J. Smith, Growth and Decadence of Constitutional Government xi (1930), quoted in R. Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians 193 (196S).
Hofstadter provides an elaborate discussion and evaluation of the views of progressive historians

on the antidemocratic nature of the constitution. The discussion is centered on, but not confined
to, the best known of these historians, Charles A. Beard. Id. at 167-345.
29 See R. Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians 192 (1968).
J. Smith, The Spirit of American Government (1907).
31 Id. at vii.
3 Id. at 27-39.

The sole modem exceptions, perhaps, are those who approach constitutional law from a
neo-Marxist perspective.
3 The fact that political scientists, e.g., A. Bentley, The Process of Government (IGOS), and
legal realists, e.g., Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1934),

argued that there was a wide discrepancy between the constitution on paper and the constitution
in practice does not in the least alter the fact that the constitution stood as the sy-mbol of political
justice. See Lerner, supra note 2, at 1292-94 & n.17; cf. Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning

Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 790, 798-807, 843 (symbolic qualities of
supreme court adjudication, first espoused by legal realists as a stratagem in an assault on the
"old Court" later used by constitutional scholars as a legitimizing device); Monaghan, Book
Review, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 307-08 (1980) (discussing the court's symbolic role in legitimating
action by other governmental organs).
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invoking the premises contained in our "perfect constitution." All this
is certainly true, but I think at one important level their disclaimers
would be misleading. One cannot read the works of Professors Tribe,
Karst, Michelman, and a whole host of other due substance theorists
without a profound feeling that, however much they might otherwise
disagree, for them the constitution is essentially perfect in one central
respect: properly construed, the constitution guarantees against the
political order most equality and autonomy values which the commentators think a twentieth century Western liberal democratic government ought to guarantee to its citizens. For these commentators,
the constitution is not Perfect with a capital "P"; it is, however,
perfect in the more limited sense that a necessary link is asserted
between the constitution and currently "valid" notions of rights,
equality and distributive justice. The constitution is, in sum, "perfect"
with a small "p."
Of course, I overstate my point. Few due substance commentators hold a "perfection" premise fully. Nevertheless, each commentator can be fairly described as "perfectionist." 35 Each asserts that
there is a clear and substantial connection between the constitution
and current conceptions of political morality, a linkage not exhausted
by any assumed constitutional guarantee of a fair political process. 30
To be sure, the commentators display important differences among
themselves in terms of the relative weight each places upon historical
tradition, current sociological formulations, and political philosophy
in defining the content of political morality. But the important fact is
that they share a distinctive and controversial underlying premise: the
"outputs" of even a fairly structured political process must satisfy
some core substantive notions of political morality.
For example, in "an avowed effort to construct a more just
constitutional order,"' 37 Professor Tribe elaborates a wide range of
equality and autonomy claims.3s His colleague Professor Michelman
3s I

do not intend the term "perfectionist" in any pejorative sense; it is simply descriptive.

30 A connection between the constitution and political justice exists at the political level, of

course. The political branches possess power to promote current notions of political justice. See
text accompanying notes 214-16 infra. What seems probable to me is that the Framers of the
1798 document and of the fourteenth amendment assumed that the states possessed such an
authority. Whether, given nineteenth century conceptions of "negative government," the
Framers assumed that the states would actually exercise this authority is another matter. In any
event, it has of course turned out that the national government, and not the states, has taken the
dominant role in shaping and implementing current societal conceptions of equality and Justice.
See Monaghan, The Burger Court And "Our Federalism," 43 Law & Contemp. Probs. 39, 40.42
(1980) [hereinafter Monaghan, Our Federalism].
37L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law iii (1978).
11E.g., id. chs. 15-17.
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has devoted much of his academic career to cementing a union between the distributional patterns of the modern welfare state and the
federal constitution. 39 Professor Karst would guarantee a whole
range of nontextually based rights against government to ensure "the
dignity of full membership in society," which, he asserts, inheres in
the "right of equal citizenship. ' 40 Professor Fiss argues that the
courts should give "concrete meaning and application" to those values
that "give our society an identity and inner coherence [and] its distinctive public morality."' 4' Professor Dworkin charges the courts with
enforcing our "constitutional morality," namely, the moral principles
"presupposed by the law and institutions of the community."' 4 Professor Perry sees the court as having a "prophetic" role in developing
moral standards in a "dialectical relationship" with congress, from
which he sees emerging a "more mature" political morality. 43 Professor Richards urges that the court apply the contractarian moral theory
44
of Professor Rawls' A Theory of Justice to constitutional questions.
Professor Alfange tells us that the court should "translate ... the
national will into constitutional terms." 45 Professor White's urging
that the courts invoke "reasons that appeal to deeply embedded cuItural values"' 46 is echoed in Professor Lupu's invitation that the court
protect those "fundamental values" that have a solid underpinning in
our historical traditions. 47 Dean Sandalow describes constitutional
law as "the means by which we express the values that we hold to be
fundamental in the operations of government." 4 Professor Brest
summarizes the view of many when he states that "constitutional

See notes 12-13 supra.
40Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1977) [hereinafter Karst, Equal Citizenship].

Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 9, 11 (1979).
41

42 R. Dworkin, Taldng Rights Seriously 126 (19T). Professor Dworkin argues "for a fusion of

constitutional law and moral theory," a connection, he asserts, "that, incredibly, has yet to take
place." Id. at 149.
43 Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 278, 291-92, 307-10 (1981).
4 D. Richards, supra note 17, at 45-49; Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the

Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1195,
1228-31 (1979); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings L.J. 957, 970-72 (1979).
45 Alfange, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1980, § 4, at 20, col. 4.
48 G. White, Patterns of American Legal Thought 160 (1978).
4' Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 9831, 935,
104041 (1979).
48 Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1069 (1981).
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adjudication should enforce those. . values which are fundamental
to our society." ' 49 So doing, Professor Brest states, will "contribute to
the well being of our society-or more narrowly, to the ends of
constitutional government."'50 So it goes. 5 For all these commentators, the constitution "has to some extent been assigned the function of
defining the American way of life, both descriptively and prescrip52
tively."
All of these formulations view the constitution as positively forbidding "wrongs" - distribution of burdens and benefits by the political process that offend some current conception of political morality.
Emphasis must be placed on "current," because no pretense is made
that these conceptions were viewed as constitutional limitations on the
political branches in either the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.
In this article I analyze the general structure of the arguments
advanced by the commentators to support their marriage of the constitution with external concepts of political morality, and then examine the principal consequences of this union for the various modes of
constitutional interpretation. I write from the perhaps "puerile" bias5
that original intent is the proper mode of ascertaining constitutional
meaning, although important concessions must now be made to the
claims of stare decisis.M From my perspective, these interpretational
premises are wholly incompatible with the perfectionist culture
theme.

41 Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204, 227
(1980) [hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest].
50 Id. at 226.
-" For an additional, partly overlapping list, see J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National
Political Process 74 (1980). See also J.Ely, supra note 20, at 43-72.
52' Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 So. Cal. L. Rev. 773, 778 (1980).
'3Miller, Book Review, 32 Fla. L. Rev. 369, 370 (1980). I also reject as a working premise
any proposition that the work of the supreme court is best understood as "politics in another
forum," with the court's role being to protect various interest groups, Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1363 n.3 (1973), or, as some would now
have it, to protect its own institutional position, see Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the
Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. Legal Stud. 431, 441-42 (1980). Similarly, I reject any
thesis that treats constitutional doctrine as simply an epiphenomenal manifestation of some
deeper determinant, such as the economic organization of society. See Monaghan, Taking
Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1979) [hereinafter Monaghan,
Court Opinions].
I See Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 7-12; text accompanying notes 170-76
infra. For a splendid description of original intent theory, see Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of
Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 261, 278-301 (1981) [hereinafter Perry,
Interpretivism].
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II
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERFECTIONISM

Most commentators agree that analyses grounded either in the
constitutional text or in the structure it creates constitute valid modes

of reasoning about constitutional "meaning." 55 But what justifies
looking outward to current or emerging conceptions of political morality as an acceptable interpretive mode? This section explores the
dominant theories that have emerged to justify such a mode of reason56

ing.

A. The Two-Clause Theon
The two-clause theory- or, to be more precise, the "two types of
clauses" theory-has provided and continues to provide the most
commonly invoked general justification for imposing "due substance"
review on the workings of the political process. Professor Corwin
expresses the theory in these terms:
[I]t will be generally found that words [in the Constitution] which

refer to governing institutions, like "jury," "legislature," "election"
have been given their strictly historical meaning [by the Supreme
Court], while words defining the subject-matter of power or of
ights like "commerce," "liberty," "property," have been deliberately moulded to the views of contemporary society.5
This theory possesses considerable power. It provides at least a general
account of what the supreme court has been doing, ss although discovery of constitutional provisions whose content is now controlled by a
"strictly historical meaning" is becoming increasingly difficult.! But
The extent to which constitutional meaning is appropriately grounded on judicial precedent presents a separate question. See section 111(B) infra.

-5 There are undoubtedly others, but the general justificatory theories discussed in the text
seem to me the most important.
I Corwin, Judicial Reviews in Action, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 639, 659-60 (1926).
-5 The modulating definitions of the "liberty" and -property" protected by the due process
clause are cases in point. Compare the historical intendment of liberty as noted in .Monaghan, Of
"Liberty," supra note 6, at 411-14, with the expansive notions held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-54 (1973); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). For contemporary restrictive
interpretations, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347-50 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
710-13 (1976). The real bases for these oscillating definitions lie in contemporary needs: they are
intended to close the federal trial courts to certain dnds of claims that are deemed to place
excessive strains on "Our Federalism." See Monaghan, Our Federalism, supra note 36, at 47-49.
-5 "Jury," for example, no longer possesses a strictly historical meaning, but instead depends
"upon the function served by the jury in contemporary society." Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
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this qualification does not impeach the general validity of the twoclause theory. Its central premise is that at least some constitutional
clauses were intended to be "moulded to the views of contemporary
society." This view has won considerable judicial60 and academic 0'
acceptance. If sound, it quite plainly offers considerable promise for
linking the constitution with current conceptions of political morality.
The two-clause theory is, however, fundamentally unhelpful for
the perfectionist. The root difficulty is that it must be advanced as a
theory of the original intention of the Framers. So understood, it is far
too fragile to support the weight of perfectionist concerns for distributive justice. Specifically, it will not support elaboration in the name of
the constitution of a strong set of nontextually based privacy, autonomy, and economic equality rights.
I begin with the observation that no convincing evidence exists
that the Framers intended a constitution with two sets of provisions,
some of which are controlled by a "strictly historical meaning"02 and
some of which are "deliberately moulded to the views of contemporary society." '6 3 At the risk of considerable oversimplification, I sug404, 410 (1972) (plurality opinion) (nonunanimous jury); see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
86-103 (1970) (six-person jury); cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134, 139 (1979) (conviction
by nonunanimous six-person jury unconstitutional); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239,
243-45 (1978) (five-person jury unconstitutional).
10 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("liberty" and "property" among
concepts "purposely left to gather meaning from experience") (citing National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). See the classic
exposition in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
Broadly speaking, two types of constitutional claims come before this Court. Most
constitutional issues derive from the broad standards of fairness written into the Constitution.... Such questions, by their very nature, allow a relatively wide play for Individual
legal judgment. The other class gives no such scope. For this second class of constitutional
issues derives from very specific provisions of the Constitution.... Their meaning was so
settled by history that definition was superfluous.
61 E.g., Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 40, at 17 (authors of fourteenth amendment
saw "principle of equal citizenship" capable of growth), adopting the theory of Bickel, Tito
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Hare. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1955); see J. Ely,
supra note 20, at 22-41 (ninth amendment, equal protection, and privileges or immunities
clauses). Ely, however, is a two-clausist of a different ilk. Asserting that certain constitutional
provisions were intended as a "delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect
certain rights that the document [does not list]," id. at 28, Ely nevertheless denies that those
provisions are meet for interpretation according to contemporary social values. They should
instead, he asserts, be given a content that advances representation-reinforcing rights. Id. ehs.
4-6; see note 156 infra.
62 Mr. Justice Gray once insisted that "all questions of constitutional construction" are, at
base, "largely a historical question." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 169 (1895) (Cray, J.,
dissenting).
See R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 99-116 (1977); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 695, 697-98; Perry, Interpretivism,
supra note 54, at 266-74.
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gest that the constitutional clauses range from the most particularized, bright-line demarcations to a set of provisions characterized by
the need for ongoing interpretation and application not to the "views
of contemporary society," but to the contemporary manifestations of
problems identified by the Framers. Limitation of the presidency to
persons of age thirty-five or more6 4 is an easy illustration of a particularized provision. Although the Framers' general concern may well
have been for maturity and experience in the chief executive, their
choice of a bright-line standard evinces a clear intention to avoid the
uncertainty (and the risk of corrupt decisions) that a judicial determination of a candidate's "maturity" would surely entail. At the other
end are the power-conferring grants of article 1, section 8, and at least
some of the limiting provisions of the bill of rights. These provisions
are rightly applied to "the sorts of evils against which the provisions
were directed and to ... their contemporary counterparts."0 5 The

first amendment, for example, encompasses subjects presumably out
of the Framers' specific contemplation but within their general purpose. 66 But I do not understand this to be the equivalent of saying
that the amendment can rightly be molded to the views of contemporary society, irrespective of the sorts of evils that concerned the
67
Framers.
The heart of the difficulty for perfectionists, however, lies elsewhere. Even if one assumes that some constitutional provisions were
intended to be molded to contemporary needs, these provisions are
plainly bounded by their language. The establishment clause,"s for
instance, manifests concern with the evils flowing from certain relationships between secular and religious institutions. It would, I submit, violate the rules of our constitutional grammar to abstract the
clause to a level so general that it will encompass all relationships in

" U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.
5.
I J. Ely, supra note 20, at 13; cf. Weens v. United States, 217 U.S. 349. 373 (1910) (Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.-). Professor Ely
suggests a distinction between the first and eighth amendments here, the latter calling for a more
avowedly contemporary approach. J. Ely, supra, at 13-14. The distinction seems to me more
asserted than demonstrated, and I reject it.
I See Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The First Amendments Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 Drake L. Rev. 1, 1, 12 (1979) (virtually every recent
first amendment decision beyond the original intention of the Framers).
67To some extent this position depends upon the coherence and intelligibility of a line much
favored by lawyers but frequently criticized: the distinction between meaning and application.
See Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, supra note 13, at 124 n.39.
68 U.S. Const. amend. 1.
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which government seeks to provide aid to centers of concentrated,
highly influential private power, such as the Chrysler Corporation.
The linguistic boundaries of the specific guarantees do not deter
the two-clause perfectionists. To fill in the open spaces, these theorists
historically have relied most heavily upon the assertedly "open texture" of the due process and equal protection clauses, investing them
with a sponge-like quality capable of absorbing any subject matter
analytically outside the boundaries of other constitutional limitations.
But any such absorptive quality in these clauses is not in their design.
It is, rather, a post-ratification invention first employed by conservative lawyers and judges to stave off the evils of socialism, 9 and subsequently borrowed by liberal commentators to protect a different set of
values.7 0 Viewed in terms of original intent, the due process clauses
are appropriately bounded by a concern for fair adjudicatory procedures, 71 even if the concept of fairness, in that context, is capable of
growth. These clauses cannot fairly be relied upon by perfectionists in
their quest for an original intent for fashioning open-ended substan7
tive principles of distributive justice. 1
Nor can the equal protection clause. 73 The historical evidence is
overwhelming that the core concern of this clause and of its companion, the fifteenth amendment, was the protection of blacks from at
least some forms of discriminatory political decisions. Taken together,
these amendments extended the principle of political equality to
blacks.74 Perhaps the general language of the equal protection clause
must be taken to include discriminations closely analogous to racial
discrimination as well. 75 So viewed, the clause would demand some
69E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10-14, 21-23 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 64 (1905). On the influential role of the bar in this respect, see B. Twiss, Lawyers and the
Constitution 18-173 (1942).
70 See notes 37-52 supra.

7' Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 177 (E. Cahn ed.

1954):
Take the phrase "due process of law" [in the fifth amendment]. It is perhaps the prime
example of a large generality in our Constitution which has gathered meaning from
experience. But who made it a large generality? Not they. We did. When they put it Into
the Fifth Amendment, its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law could
make a phrase.... It meant a procedural process, which could be easily ascertained from
almost any lawbook. We turned the legal phrase into common speech and raised Its
meaning into the similitude of justice itself.
72 See J. Ely, supra note 20, at 15-18, 189-90 nn.13-15; Monaghan, Of "Liberty," supra note
6, at 414-16. But see Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1066 n.9 (1980).
" U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
7' See R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 20-51 (1977); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 56-59 (1955).
'5 J, Ely, supra note 20, at 149.
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general judicial concern with the integrity of the political process to
assure that it takes account of the interests of all citizens. 76 This, in
turn, would call for careful review of certain types of discriminatory
political outcomes, not because those outcomes transgress unwritten
substantive norms, but because they do not usually occur unless there
has been a violation of the process norm of political equality. 7 There
is, however, no warrant in the historical origins of the equal protection clause for invalidating the outcomes of a fairly structured political process simply because those outcomes violate some ideal substan78
tive "antidiscrimination" norms.
As a constitutional concept, equality demands no more than the
inclusion of groups into the political process.79 What is at stake in the

perfectionist quest is quite different: it is the measuring of political
outcomes against norms of distributive justice- the kinds of problems
which now usually surface under the label of substantive due process.
My objection is thus the same as before. How do "two-clause" perfectionists justify the use of any clause to permit general judicial concern

with the outputs of a fair political process?
For some commentators the ninth amendment and the privileges
or immunities clause80 accomplish just that. These commentators argue that the ninth amendment was intended to create a broad range
of nontextual rights against the national government,8 ' and that the

"0Id. at 148-70.
77 Id. at 153-57.
78 In discussing the segregation cases, Judge Linde calls our attention to the -reverse incorporation" phenomenon by which equal protection notions are read back into the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. See Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale L.J. 227,
233-34 (1972). He denies that it is "unthinkable" that the constitution could place the states
under constitutional constraints with respect to equality, particularly race discrimination, but
provide no basis for a similar restriction upon the national government. Id. Professor Ely
responds by pointing to the ninth amendment, "that old constitutional jester," as an appropriate
textual source for such a limitation on the national government. See J. Ely, supra note 20, at 33.
This argument is troublesome. The ninth amendment coexisted with slavery and its intellectual
underpinnings of black inferiority, and accordingly, any invocation of that amendment to bar
federally imposed segregation needs a showing that the amendments content was not frrevocably fixed as of 1791. See Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, supra note 13, at 126-27. Of
course, if the ninth amendment is viewed as concerned with process-reinforcing values generally
and on an ongoing basis, the initial exclusion of blacks from that concern may fairly be said to
have fallen with the addition of the Civil War amendments.
79 J. Ely, supra note 20, at 135-36; Stone, Equal Protection and the Search for Justice. 22
Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 8-10, 16 (1980). See also J. Lively, Democracy 10-12 (1975).
0 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
81See J. Ely, supra note 20, at 38 ("In fact, the conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was
intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the constitution is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able to support.").
Professor Ely stands alone in insisting the ninth amendment is a source of process-reinforcing,
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"debates in Congress on the [fourteenth] amendment leave one in
little doubt of the intention of its framers to nationalize civil liberty in
the United States" 82 through the privileges or immunities clause. For
these commentators, ascribing a substantive content to due process
and equal protection is defensible. While one can regret the technically unsatisfying use of the "wrong" clauses, little of substance turns
on the fact that the due process and equal protection clauses, rather
than the ninth amendment and the privileges or immunities clause,
' 83
are employed to ensure "due substance.
The foregoing argument has force. However, I would emphasize
that any invocation of either the ninth amendment or the privileges or
immunities clause by two-clause perfectionists necessarily rests upon
several troublesome premises. The initial assumption is that the content of the two clauses is identical. But this is hardly self-evident.
Indeed, like the guaranty clause,84 the ninth amendment seems to me
entirely empty, supplying no ascertainable direction to the courts. 85
It is, accordingly, far too indefinite to provide any judicial authority
for the development of substantive rights against the political

rather than "substantive," rights. Cf. C. Black, Decision According to Law 44-68 (1981) (ninth
amendment source of substantive rights against federal and state governments); B. Patterson,
The Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955) (unenumerated "individual inherent rights"); Hamlin,
The Bill of Rights or the First Ten Amendments to the United States Constitution, 68 Com. L.J.
233, 235-36 (1963) (right "to be let alone"); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, 11 Ind. L.J. 309, 320-23 (1936) (suggesting privacy and property rights protected
by ninth amendment); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 231, 237-67 (1975) (rights under international law guaranteed by
ninth amendment); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ... Retained by the People"?, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787, 804-12 (1962) (textual standard should be "the entire Constitution");
Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and its Recent Development, 8
Tulsa L.J. 1, 45-55 (1972) (nontextual liberties with "historical antecedents" and "non-historlcal" fundamental rights named in Universal Declaration of Human Rights Protected by ninth
amendment).
For critical appraisals of the ninth amendment as a source of substantive rights, see E.
Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights 63-64 (1957); M. Goodman, The Ninth Amendment (1981),
Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1980); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding
Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 695, 697; Dunbar, James Madison and
the Ninth Amendment, 42 Va. L. Rev. 627, 639-40 (1956); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 149-55.
82 E. Corwin, Liberty Against Government 118 (1948).
83 See Monaghan, Of "Liberty," supra note 6, at 416. But seeJ. Ely, supra note 20, at 18-19
(use of wrong clause "may matter, because of the negative feedback effect the notion of
substantive due process seems to be having on the proper function of the Due Process Clause").
4U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
85 1 recognize that the privileges or immunities clause is less vulnerable on this score. Its
content could be restricted to the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, see R. Berger,
Government by Judiciary 20-50 (1977), and perhaps also to the bill of rights, see Curtis, the Bill
of Rights as Limitations on State Authority 45 (1980).
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process."6 But even if both amendments are appropriate repositories

for an external schedule of rights, a showing is necessary that this was
not understood to be a list closed as of 1791 or 1868.7 No relevant
evidence on the ninth amendment and very little with respect to the
privileges or immunities clause supports an inference that either was
intended to have a dynamic character.18 If I am correct in that view,
neither clause, viewed through the lens of original intent, provides
support for the scope of judicial due substance review as it now exists
in the sex-children-family area, to say nothing of the scope of due
substance review advocated by the perfectionists.
B. The Two Constitutions Theory
The intellectually troublesome character of the two-clause theory
has led to bolder efforts to reconcile conceptions of political justice
with the "constitution." Some modern commentators have undertaken an effort to refocus our view of constitutional law so that it
embraces, in addition to the written text carried around by Justice
Black, the authentic tradition developed to accompany it. To some
degree, this restates a concept quite familiar to political scientists,
who have long emphasized the difference between the constitution on
paper and the way government actually operates, and to the legal
The scant legislative history of the ninth amendment indicates that it was intended to
counter an objection to the bill of rights: that "by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant
of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration." I Annals
of Cong. 439 (1789) (remarks of J. Madison). The failure to give content to those rights left a
vacuum without textual standards for adjudication. Consider, for example, the argument of
Dean Redlich that "the textual standard should be the entire Constitution" and its "image of a
free and open society." Redlich, supra note 81, at 810. By way of illustration, Dean Redlch
argued that the right to contract for conditions of employment "hardly fits into the scheme of
rights set forth in our Constitution"-a rather remarkable conclusion, since the obligations of
contract clause is at least in the neighborhood-whereas the right of intimacy of [the] marital
relationship" does "fit into the pattern of [freedom] from unreasonable searches and sizures.Id. at 811. Just why the "intimacy of the marital relationship" fits the constitutional plan,
whereas the freedom of contract does not, seems to me to depend more on the inclinations of
Dean Redlich than the United States constitution. See Commentary, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 525, 532
(1981) (remarks of Prof. Ely). The wide variety of rights that has seemed to commentators so
plainly protected by the ninth amendment-starting with the right of privacy and ending with
rights under international law, see note 81 supra-suggests that the amendments contours are
too indefinite for the development of substantive rights.
' See Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 Va. L. Rev. 627, 641 (1956)
("ninth amendment is associated with a certain class of rights both historically and by documentary location") (emphasis added); Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, supra note 13, at
126-27.
" The writers cited in note 81 supra who invoke the ninth amendment as a source for
nontextually based substantive rights slide over this difficulty. See Perry, Interpretivism, supra
note 54, at 272-73 cf. Laycock, Book Review, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 343, 348-51 (1981) (text.based
argument for dynamic character of ninth amendment).
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realists, particularly Professor Karl Llewellyn, who elaborated upon
that difference in great detail in 1934 in a provocative and seminal
article. 89 The original writers on this theme frequently focused on
questions of structure and design. When they considered questions of
distributive justice, they decried the symbolic use of the constitution
to preserve American capitalism against the onslaught of regulation
and social welfare legislation. 90

Professor Paul Brest invokes a part of the realist tradition. 0 '
Professor Brest is centrally concerned with normative matters, and he
urges as a normative proposition that resort to tradition is properly

made in order to validate the body of unwritten civil liberties that has
2
developed in the supreme court in the name of equality and liberty.1
For him, "the practice of supplementing and derogating from the text
and original understanding" 93 possesses at least as strong a claim to

legitimacy as reliance upon original intent."4 Professor Brest's views
are discussed in detail below.9 5 Suffice it to say here that this approach has the virtue of recognizing that the text itself is far from
perfect, and in no realistic sense can be made so by "interpretation."90
Professor Levinson supports a two constitutions view with an analogy
to the Roman Catholic Church, in which both the biblical text and
the apostolic tradition constitute the relevant "constitutional" doc-

trine. 7 But the analogy is unconvincing. In Roman Catholic theology these twin sources never conflict. Professor Brest, however, posits
that conflict as a salient characteristic of our constitutional law,0 8 a
89 Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1934). See also H.
Horwill, The Usages of the American Constitution ch. 1 (1925).
9 Lerner, supra note 2, at 1316-19.
91The realists counted among their number some who were cynics-authors of the doctrine
that law is what the judge ate for breakfast- and some who were highly moral persons moved to
advance the law in directions they saw fit. See Hart, American Jurisprudence through English
Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969, 977 (1977). It Is the moral
strand of the realist tradition that Professor Brest invokes.
i2Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 225-26. For convenience, I have characterized this as a "two constitution" theory. Professor Brest himself apparently uses the word
"constitution" to refer to the text only, and views "tradition" as having independent authoritative stature.
93Id. at 225.
11 Id. at 225-26 & n.80. Professor Brest argues that the "[f]act of this tradition undermines
the exclusivity of the written document," and that the oath "to support this Constitution...
must be understood in the context of two centuries of Constitutional decisionmaldng." Id.
9 See text accompanying notes 161-99 infra.
9 "The constitution reflects a pragmatic and not always principled compromise among a
variety of regional, economic and political interests." Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49,
at 229.
97 Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 12628, 135-37.
11 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 224.
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recognition that forms the basis of his effort to establish tradition as an
authoritative source for judicial reasoning.
Other variations of the two constitutions theory have surfaced.
For example, in his article in this Symposium, Professor Perry advocates a version of the two constitutions theory in which the court is to
make recourse to both the constitutional text and the value judgments
of the Justices themselves when no explicit constitutional provision is
controlling. 99 Professor Dworkin advances still another two constitutions theory. In a fine book, Robert Cover has explored the dilemma
of conscience faced by pre-Civil War judges who, though morally
opposed to slavery, felt compelled by their offices to enforce constitutional and statutory provisions that recognized and protected slavery. 00 No such dilemma existed, Professor Dworkin responded. In
any "hard case,"10 1judges could simply have disregarded the constitutional and statutory provisions because the relevant "law of the community" includes its underlying "general principles of justice and
fairness." 102 The most extreme two constitutions theory, however, is
advanced by Professor Murphy. In his effort to impress a "perfect
quality" upon the constitution, Professor Murphy advances the astonishing view that courts are free to reject constitutional amendments
that do not "fit" the constitutional order.10 3 Apparently, a mere
constitutional provision cannot be allowed to interfere with a political-legal result mandated by proper conceptions of political morality.
C. The Social Good Model
The insistence by several commentators that all legislation is
invalid unless it is for the "general welfare" or "the common good"
provides the basis for some commentators' efforts at developing a
plausible rational-basis standard of review. 10 In the hands of perfec99 Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 278, 306-07 (1981).
103 See R. Cover, Justice Accused 119-23 (1975).
101Professor Dworldn concedes that in an "easy" case, in which the slave owners claim was
based on an incontestable reading of a clearly constitutional statute, the judge would not have
the same license to disregard constitutional and statutory provisions. See Greenawalt, Policy,
Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 991, 1050 (1977).
102 Dworkdn, Book Review, Times Literary Supplement, Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437, col. 5; see
Denvir, Professor Dworkin and an Activist Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 45 Alb. L.

Rev. 13, 19-27 (1980).

"I Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 So. Cal. L. Rev. 703, 754-55 (19S0).
Professor Brest at least concedes that the court could not ignore the mandate of a -contemporary" constitutional amendment. Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 20-9 n.94; see text
accompanying notes 182-86 infra.
'0 See Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 17-21, 53-56
(1980); cf. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79 (190S) (rational

basis test applicable to legislation directed at social and economic welfare).
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tionists, however, this insistence reflects yet another effort to develop
a strong set of unwritten civil liberties. The line of argument is clear
enough: if some public good limitation is to be taken seriously by the
courts, it must be elaborated by a judicial balancing of interests. In
balancing those interests, the argument concludes, one is forced to
acknowledge some form of due substance review. And the product of
such a review would be, of course, a schedule of autonomy, privacy,
and equality claims assertable against the political branches of government. 01 5
The argument appears to draw strength from our conception of
the ordinary workings of the courts. We expect courts to interpret
statutes, at least in their marginal applications, on the premise that
the legislature seeks to promote the public good and to resolve common law controversies in accordance with such a standard. But to
interpret a statute or fashion common law in light of some conception
of the common good is one thing; to invalidate a statute on such a
basis is quite another. Even if concepts such as the general welfare or
common good are assumed valid grounds of decision in the statutory
and common law areas (where the courts of necessity must provide
some basis for decision), they are far too indeterminate in content for
generating a strong set of judicially enforceable autonomy and equality claims to control the contrary determinations of the political
process. 106 Moreover, capacity aside, the question of legitimacy remains. The fact that other branches of government besides the courts
have authority to make law raises legitimacy questions for judicial
lawmaking in these circumstances. Surely the fact that the courts can
make law when the political organs are silent (the common law
context) does not legitimate a similar authority when the political
organs have spoken (the constitutional context). Any such premise
seems to me plainly illegitimate, given the basic constitutional design
of representative government.
Stripped of any support from the workings of courts in the nonconstitutional context, the intellectual underpinnings of the social
good model are not evident. To be sure, several constitutional provisions plainly presuppose some substantive review in the name of the
common good: the federal spending power' 017 is conditioned upon
105 See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 8-7, at 451-53 (1978); Perry, Abortion, tile
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 689, 693-94 (1976).
108 See the classic attack on the indeterminacy of the public good concept in J. Schumpter,
Communism, Capitalism and Democracy, 250-52 (1947). See also J. Ely, supra note 20, at
48-70.
107 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 1.
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some minimal satisfaction of the "general Welfare," and the taking
clause 0 8 requires that any taking be for a "public use." That pretty
much exhausts the list, however (unless, that is, the Preamble is
judicially enforceable 0 9). There is no convincing textual reason why
the general outputs of the political process need satisfy any judicially
formulated conception of the public good.110
It is, indeed, attractive to take interest group theory seriously and
insist that legislative resolution of interest group clashes should be
conclusive on the courts, at least so long as the political process is
"fairly" structured."' But even if one disagrees and concludes that all
political conduct must pass muster against some conception of the
public good, 12 the bottom line remains the same. Stated as a criterion
for judicial review, the standard is necessarily a weak one, as the
spending and taking cases illustrate." 3 Courts lack the institutional
capacity to second-guess political determinations of the public good
unless those determinations are beyond reason, something that seldom
occurs in the real world. It is a tour de force, therefore, to suggest that
the courts can elaborate a strong set of fundamental rights against
which to test the outcomes of the fair political process in the name of
such amorphous concepts as ensuring the common good or a "just
constitutional order."' 1 4 Any such freewheeling judicial lawmaking
101U.S. Cost. amend. V.
' Lest this appear far-fetched, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179. 210 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (ninth amendment "includes customary, traditional, and time-honored rights...
that come within the sweep of 'The Blessings of Liberty' mentioned in the preamble to the
Constitution"); Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (three judge
court), vacated and remanded, 398 U.S. 275 (1970) (among constitution's expressed purpases
"was the desire to 'insure domestic tranquility' and 'promote the general Welfare.' -).
110Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 17-21. 53-56 (19SO).
gives insufficient attention to this point. Of course, the lack of an identifiable conception of the
public good might, in particular instances, generate an inference of an unfairly structured
political process.
"I For a fascinating recent decision, see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.Fritz. 449 U.S.
166, 189-93 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging that the political process was not fairly
structured because it had simply ratified an industry-labor bargain in which respondents
interests were not represented). See generally J.Ellul, The Political Illusion 35.42, 174-84 (1967)
(emphasizing the impact of interest groups and "experts" on statutory enactment): H. Merry,
Five Branch Government 24-28, 36-60, 81-86 (1980) (interest groups in the content of a governmental bureaucracy of specialized regulation).
112 One can make a convincing case that the Framers of the constitution e\Pceted that all
political action would reflect a concern for the common good. See B. Bailyn, D. Davis, D.
Donald, J. Thomas, R. Wiebe & G.Wood, The Great Republic 338 (1977).
I13 On the spending power, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,80 (1976) (7It is for Congress to
decide which expenditures will promote the general welfare-); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis. 301
U.S. 548, 583-98 (1937); Monaghan, Our Federalism, supra note 36, at 4142. On the taking
power, see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954).
"I4L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law iii (1978).
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is inconsistent with "[t]he policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process [which] is the distinguishing
characteristic of the [constitutional] system." 5
D. Substantive Entitlements From Process Values
A fourth and final justificatory theory has recently emerged in
the work of Professor Michelman, one of the most persistent and
articulate commentators seeking to import notions of distributive justice into the constitution. Michelman's earlier writings elaborate the
general structural arguments of Professor John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice"6 in an effort to connect them with the distributional patterns
of the modern welfare state and, more importantly, to fasten that
connection to the constitution of the United States." 7 Responding to
criticism that no such constitutional link could be justified,11 8 Professor Michelman has lately attempted to justify this view by invoking
the process-oriented approach of Professor Ely." 0
Professor Michelman assumes the general validity of Ely's view,
and for the purposes of this argument so do I. Professor Michelman
argues that substantive entitlements to minimum levels of basic goods
and services can be inferred from the constitutional goal of reinforcing
and protecting the process of political representation. These distributional minima are necessary to protect the capacity to seek and obtain
political access and to protect "against stigmatizing discriminations in
treatment that reflect, reinforce, or facilitate systematic bias against
one's group." 20 If this is a logical and persuasive extrapolation of
Professor Ely's argument, then Ely's theory is in need of reconsideration.' 2 1 Exploration of this issue is, however, not the aim of this
article. Let me just say that I do not think it possible to infer much, if

I's

A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 19 (1962).

116 J. Rawls,

A Theory of Justice (1971).

117 Michelman,

One View of Rawls, supra note 13, at 997-1018; Michelman, Protecting the

Poor, supra note 12, at 9-19.
118 R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 503-04 (2d ed. 1977); Monaghan, The Constitution
at Harvard, supra note 13, at 118-20; Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev,
715, 732-57, 784-94 (1978); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 66-70.
"I Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 13, at 665-74.
120 Id. at 674-79.
121 It does not, however, seem accurate to me. Ely rather explicitly argues that the constitution cannot be interpreted as requiring some "appropriate" distributional pattern against which
allocations of benefits could be tested- a so-called "ends-test." J. Ely, supra note 20, at 135-36.
That seems precisely where Professor Michelman's theory is destined to lead. Ely himself regards
the distributional pattern as evidence of the fairness of the political process. Id. at 136.
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anything, by way of specific welfare entitlements from a process-oriented approach, and that the lines of argument against Professor
Michelman are readily discernible. The point of political access is to
secure politicalequality- a right to have one's interests fairly considered by the political organs of government. The relationship between
political equality and other sorts of equality should not mislead us. '
The fact that some measure of other kinds of equality-social or
economic- may be useful to secure "reasonable" political equality
does not demonstrate that those other equalities can be derived in any
concrete way from the concept of political equality.'2 Moreover,
Professor Michelman makes no empirical demonstration that the minimum quantum of social and economic goods necessary to secure
political equality would be lacking in our society even in the absence
of the current distributional patterns generated by the welfare state.
Like the two-clause and two constitutions theorists, Professor
Micheliman seeks liberation from the constitutional text. From process
premises he attempts to generate, and ultimately to impose on the
political process, substantive welfare norms which cannot be directly
ascribed to either the text of the constitution or the structure it creates.
Of course, even were Professor Michelman's general thesis sound, it
would provide no basis for judicial creation of the privacy and autonomy rights so dear to the heart of perfectionist commentators. 24

For me, therefore, the entire concept of due substance review
poses one of the most unsettling problems in constitutional theory. It is
not that "substantive" due process is linguistically self-contradictory.

,-* See J. Lively, Democracy 20, 50-51 (1975).
2 Id. at 67 (no simple linear development between socioeconomic and political development).
I do not overlook the fact that numerous writers, Locke and Rousseau among them, have
been concerned with whether political democracy is compatible with wide inequalities in

economic and social status. Their concern, however, was tempered by a belief in the capacity of
legislative systems to ensure that each person's political equality is protected despite secial and

economic disparity. See J. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of
Civil Government § 54, in Two Treatises of Government (P. Laslett ed. 19C0) (London 1690O); 1.
Rousseau, The Social Contract 46-47 (C. Frankel trans. 1947) (Paris 1762) ("It is precisely

because the force of circumstances tends always to destroy equality that the force of legisation
must always tend to maintain it."). Eighteenth century conceptions of political equality plainly
did not connect the idea of political equality with some level of social security. See T. Marshall,
Class, Citizenship and Social Development 71-83 (1964).
124 This

point Michelman himself admits. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 13, at

676-77.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 56:353

It is not any longer, if one accepts the teachings of ordinary language
philosophy that "meaning is use."' 12 5 The core problem is one of
constitutional theory, not of language: can the framers of a constitution embody their policy choices in a "permanent" document, so as to
prevent overruling those policy choices in light of perceived contemporary needs? English constitutional theorists speculate about this
issue in the context of "entrenching" a bill of rights so as to insulate it
from the reach of subsequent legislative majorities. 12 For us, the
problem is how to insulate the Framers' policy choices from being
overriden by a subsequent majority of the supreme court.
III
PERFEcrIONISM AND THE MODES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The perfectionist culture theme reflects itself in the modes of
constitutional interpretation as well as in explicit efforts at linking

political morality with the constitution. Not surprisingly, perfectionists display no appreciable interest in interpretative modes rooted in
either original intent or stare decisis. Instead, their preference is to
analogize consitutional interpretation to the evolutionary, openended, case-by-case approach characteristic of the common law
method of adjudication.1 2 7 This mode draws freely upon such sources
as custom, conventional morality, and economic, social, and philosophic theory.
A. Original Intent
1. In General
A distinction is sometimes posited between textual analysis and
original intent inquiry such that only the constitutional text and not
"parol evidence" can be examined to ascertain constitutional meaning.128 But any such distinction seems to be entirely wrong. All law,
1 See J. Brigham, Constitutional Language: An Interpretation of Judicial Decision 73-77
(1978); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31
U. Chi. L. Rev. 502, 521 (1964).
"I See H. Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals 22-40 (1980). For an assertion that English
judges should have far-reaching power to annul anything which they find "repugnant to reason
or to fundamentals," see the remarks of Lord Denning in The Times (London), Nov. 21, 1980, at

4, col. 5.
127See text accompanying notes 194, 218-22 infra.
'2

See Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 205-13. See also Schauer, An Essay on

Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.

-

(1982) (forthcoming) ("It is unfortu-

nately common for commentators to conflate textual and historical approaches to constitutional
interpretation.").
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the constitution not excepted, is a purposive ordering of norms.'0
Textual language embodies one or more purposes, and the text may be
understood and usefully applied only if its purposes are understood.
No convincing reason appears why purpose may not be ascertained
from any relevant source, including its "legislative history." Thus the
central issue is the role of original intent in constitutional interpretation.
I begin the inquiry with an assumption. I think it would be an
intuitive, widely shared premise that the supreme court in 1800
should have accorded interpretative primacy to original intent in
ascertaining the "meaning' of the constitution.' 3 0 This interpretational premise is implicitly conceded by commentators otherwise hostile to original intent theory, who would recognize the primacy of
"recent" constitutional amendments.' 3' Judicial opinions at least
purport to take original intent seriously,13 2 apparently reflecting the
belief that the original intent mode is not simply a matter of ex-pository style in opinion writing. It is, rather, a way of thinking about
constitutional "meaning" that follows from the basic concepts that
legitimate judicial review itself. 133 The root premise is that the su'2 See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
630, 661-69 (1958); Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 263,
266-73 (1980). Since law involves a purposive or normative use of language, insights derived
from the study of the use of language in other contexts seem to me of limited utility. But see
Schauer, supra note 128, at -. (forthcoming) (advocating greater stress on the philosophy of
language and asserting, among other things, a "close parallel between constitutional interpretation and some theories of literary criticism.").
130 SeeJ. Ely, supra note 20, at 15-16. Although the intention of the ratiflers, not the Framers,
is in principle decisive, the difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice
but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it. Id. at 17-18; Monaghan, The
Constitution at Harvard, supra note 13, at 126. Of course, original intent theory is not concerned
with the hidden intent of the Framers. The text, as normally understood, is our "most important
datum,- J. Ely, supra note 20, at 16. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, the Framers and ratifiers
"must be presumed to have intended what they said." Gibbons v.Ogden, 2- U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
188 (1824).
131 See Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 229, n.94; note 103 supra; text accompanying notes 182-86 infra.
'3 Reliance upon original intent occurs even in opinions whose actual holdings seem wholly at
variance with original intent. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-99 (1970) (7history"
shows jury trial provision was to be understood functionally; held twelve jurors, the historical
number, not required); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 22.6, 288-312 (1964) (Goldberg, I., concurring) (arguing in purported reliance on original intent that the fourteenth amendment prohibits
privately owned restaurants from discriminating on grounds of race, despite abundant historical
evidence to the contrary); C. Miller, supra note 27, at 149-69; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 706 (1975) ("[I]f judges resort to bad Interpretation in
preference to honest exposition of deeply held but unwritten ideals, it must be because they
perceive the latter mode of decisionmaking to be of suspect legitimacy."), cited in J. Ely, supra
note 20, at 186 n.9.
13 See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-50 (1905); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-88 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377
(1821); Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 400 (1833).
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preme court, like other branches of government, is constrained by the
written constitution.134 Our legal griindnorm has been that the body
politic can at a specific point in time definitively order relationships,
and that such an ordering is binding on all organs of government until
changed by amendment. 135 Thus in 1789 the body politic determined
that a president must be at least thirty-five years of age, 30 and that
determination remains operative.
Nonetheless, any current gravitational pull of original intent theory seems largely confined to members of the court. Original intent
theory in the academy is quite another matter. This fact is amply
illustrated by the controversy surrounding the appearance of Raoul
Berger's Government by Judiciary.137 One can, and some do, quarrel
with his view that the sole purpose of the fourteenth amendment was
to adopt and "constitutionalize" the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 38 But the
acerbic and inflamed nature of most of the responses suggests that we
are witnessing more than a "mere" historical debate. 13 I think the
reason is not hard to find. Perfectionists recognize that if Berger is
correct, much of the supreme court's protection of civil liberties is at
variance with the original intent of the adopters of the amendment.
More importantly, they perceive this to be a serious and unsettling
charge. Perfectionists therefore feel compelled to deal with original
intent, one way or another.
Their responses vary. Some perfectionists, including most "twoclause" theorists, genuinely believe that original intent is on their side;
any quarrel is, in the end, "only" over what the history shows. 40
'1

"[C]ourts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument." Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). It is "of the essence of constitutionalism," Professor

Kurland writes, "that all government-not excepting the courts-is to be constrained by
established principles." P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 8 (1970).
135The Federalist No. 78, at 494 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) ("Until the people have,
by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it Is binding
upon themselves collectively, as well as individually"). See generally, R. Berger, supra note 63,
at 363-72. Of course, the currently binding quality of past constitutional arrangements cannot be
proved simply by asserting that the Framers intended it so. See note 177 infra. For an illuminat-

ing exploration of this issue, see Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 187, 194-203
(1981).
136U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, ci. 5.
137 R. Berger, supra note 63.
Im Id. at 20-68, 134-221; see, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 20, at 28-30, 198-201 nn.64, 66 & 70;
Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16
Wake Forest L. Rev. 45 (1980).
139 For a review of the criticism and a sympathetic defense of Berger, see Bridwell, the Scope
of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority Rule, 31 S.C.L. Rev. 617, 631-56

(1980).
140 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 103-10 (1962); Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra
note 40, at 11-17; Grey, supra note 132, at 715-17; Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the
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Others openly despair about the possibility of any meaningful reconstruction of original intent, and contend that the effort at understanding the past all too frequently masks a deeper effort at finding a
"useable past." '41 By postulating intractable methodological difficulties, criticism of this order seeks to establish a strong separation between "intention" and "meaning," and it insists that the former concept becomes increasingly empty with the passage of time.142

Although the difficulties of establishing original intent are formidable,1 43 they are by no means intractable. Significant difficulty in
historical reconstruction is not present with respect to some constitutional provisions, 144 and with respect to others it is at least partially
ameliorated by the extensive body of precedent accumulated over the
years by courts nearer in time to the origins of the relevant provision.1 45 Most importantly, the language of the constitution itself

remains. Whatever the difficulties, that language constitutes the best
evidence of original intention.146

In any event, the core question

remains: do the basic postulates of the constitutional order require
that the court undertake the task of ascertaining original intent, as
best it can?

My impression is that few of the present generation of constitutional theorists are concerned with what the relevant history "really"
Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 6S9,
695-707 (1976).
1"I
Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 219; Grey, supra note 132, at 715-17.
142 C. Miller, supra note 27, at 153-55; Sandalow, supra note 48, at 1060.S; Wofford, supra
note 125, at 502, 509-11, 528-32.
1 See C. Miller, supra note 27, at 155-61. I fully recognize that the words used in the text
may have had a different meaning for the Framers than we would on a first reading attach to
them, a point developed at length by Professor W.W. Crosskey in his controversial two-volume
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953). Moreover, the original
meaning of words may get wholly lost. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v.Multi-State Tax
Comn'n, 434 U.S. 452, 463 (1978) (court resorts to general structural analysis because "whatever distinct meanings the framers attributed to the terms [agreements and compacts] in Art. I,
§ 10, those meanings were soon lost").
144 Either because they are quite specific, e.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.
5 (age of president),
or because they were amply discussed by the Framers, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 41-43 a.
Madison) (art. I, § 8).
"I E.g., Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 451-52 (1805) (citizens of District of
Columbia may not invoke diversity jurisdiction); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch). 137,
173-80 (1803) (scope of judicial review); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 3SS,396 (1798)
(Patterson, J., concurring); id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) (prohibition on e post facto law
of art. I, § 10 extends to criminal cases only). For a discussion of why these decisions are
accorded special deference, see C. Miller, supra note 27, at 508-07.
146 See J. Ely, supra note 20, at 16; B. Eckhardt & C. Black, The Tides of Power 6 (1976)
("The text, however, it may be departed from in fact, always sta)s there .... ... Moreover,
unlike the court sitting in 1800, present interpreters have the benefit of Madison's Notes and
other collateral source material.
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shows with respect to original intent, or with the difficulty of any
undertaking along that line. They simply do not care. This is the

direct result of the current dominance of law professors in constitutional law scholarship. Until the 1940's constitutional law was
a subject of importance to both political scientists and historians,
and they-Lowell,1 47 Beard, 48 Corwin,149 Willoughby, 1' ° McLaughlin' 51made substantial contributions to our understanding of this subject.
Political scientists have, however, become increasingly concerned
with the study of political sociology, 152 a shift which necessarily diminished their interest in the doctrinal work of the supreme court.
Law professors now occupy this field virtually alone, and few if any of
them have either an interest in or the background for meticulous
historical scholarship. Moreover, law professors are problem solvers
by training. Their eyes are on the present, not the past. By disposition,
therefore, they are unsympathetic to being bound by the chains of the
past.

Until recently, academic lawyers seldom argued that original
intent simply cannot be ascertained. Rather, they have sought to
sterilize the concept, most typically by conceptualizing original intent
at a level of abstraction that, in effect, removes it as an interpreta-

tional constraint.153 This technique is, of course, at the root of the
two-clause theory, and seems to me to permeate entirely the work of
"I J.

Lowell, Political Essays 140-49 (1888).
Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1925); C.
Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution (1912).
"4 See E. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today (1920) and subsequent
editions. Of course, Corwin was at times skeptical about whether one could divine the original
intention and about what value it should have. See Corwin, The Dissolving Structure of Our
Constitutional Law, 20 Wash. L. Rev. 185, 193 (1945) (it is "obviously impossible in this year of
grace to know what was intended 'by the Constitution,' or by the Framers or the ratiflers
thereof, with regard to matters which did not exist in 1787"). See also Corwin's rejection of
"speculative ideas about what the framers of the constitution or the generation which adopted It
intended it should mean." Such ideas, Corwin added, "have no application to the main business
of constitutional interpretation, which is to keep the constitution adjusted to the advancing needs
of time." Corwin, Constitution v. Constitutional Theory, 19 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 290, 303 (1925).
150W. Willoughby, Principles of the Constitutional Law of the United States, §§ 28-31, 39-41
(2d ed. 1930). Professor Willoughby cautioned that "resort to the 'spirit' or 'theory' of the
Constitution for interpretative purposes is an unwise policy . . since it stands In essential
opposition to other rules... for determining the power granted to or limitations imposed on the
Federal Government by the Constitution." Id. § 30. See also W. Willoughby, The American
Constitutional System (1919); W. Willoughby, The Supreme Court of the United States (1890).
151A. McLaughlin, The Constitutional History of the United States (1935); A. McLaughlin,
The Foundations of American Constitutionalism (1932); A. McLaughlin, The Courts, the Constitution, and Parties chs. 1, 4-5 (1912).
,s See Eckstein, On the "Science" of the State, 108 Daedalus 1 (1979).
'5
See Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, supra note 13, at 127.
148 C.
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Professors Tribe and Karst. 15 Currently the most fashionable formula is that the constitutional language is best understood simply as

an open-ended delegation to future interpreters to resolve problems in
accordance with the Framers' "concepts," but not their specific "conceptions." 1 55 Given the evolutionary nature of language, the avail-

1

For example, Professor Karst writes:

It need not be argued that this history demonstrates that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment sought to write the principle of equal citizenship, with all its modem implications, into the Constitution. It is enough to show that they saw themselves as adopting a
principle of equal citizenship, and that the principle was "capable of growth.Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 40, at 17, citing Bickel, The Original Understanding and
the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1955).
It is somewhat unconvincing to assert that the Framers of the fourteenth amendment sought
to write a principle of equal citizenship as Professor Karst uses the term. The Civil Rights Act of
1866 was clearly not intended to safeguard the rights of suffrage or jury service, two indispensible incidents of equal citizenship. Biekel, supra, at 56. It is hardly certain that the fourteenth
amendment was intended to do more in this respect. The working draft of the amendment,
submitted to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction by Senator Stewart of Nevada, included a
prospective suffrage provision prohibiting discrimination as to the right to vote after July 4.
1876. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 83-84 (1914),
reprinted in Bickel, supra, at 41. Resistance to any form of enfranchisement led to an abandonment of that provision in favor of language reducing representation in Congress to the extent the
franchise was denied. Stevens himself, in enumerating the rights protected by the proposed
amendment, included several protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but omitted the
franchise. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1865). John Bingham of Ohio stated
explicitly that "[t]he amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to
Congress of regulating suffrage." Id. at 2542-43; see R. Berger, supra note 63, at 52.S; Berger,
Ely's"Theory of Judicial Review," 42 Ohio St. L.J. 87, 87-96 (1981). One wonders whether it is
meaningful to assert that the amendments authors had any principle of equal citizeship'--in
Professor Karst's sense-in mind. If so, it was a citizenship that lacked essential dements of
citizenship.
It is, moreover, even more attenuated to assert that the Framers viewed the principle as
"capable of growth." That conclusion of Alexander Bickel relies for support on the Inference that
John Bingham, the author of § 1, desired a compromise permitting "the appearance of a careful
enumeration of rights" while "[deferring] the question of giving greater protection than was
extended by the Civil Rights Act." Bickel, supra, at 62-63. That is a speculative conclusion, not
history. See R. Berger, Government By Judiciary 99-116 (1977). At best, moreover, it proves
only that Congress hoped to enact further legislation, not that the judiciary in the absence of
such legislation was to broaden the amendments scope; and it purports at best to be the view of
a minority only. But see J. Ely, supra note 20, at 200 n.69 ("Obtaining ratification of open-ended
language in the expectation that it will be given an open-ended interpretation is not playing a
trick. Trickery would inhere in gaining ratification offacially speciflc language and then giving
it a latitudinarian construction, or... in gaining ratification of open-ended language and then
forever limiting its reach .... ").
s R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 132-37 (1978) (adopting a distinction employed by J.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 5-6 (1971)). "Dworkin offers absolutely no evidence whatoever in
support of the proposition [that the Framers intended to constitutionalize broad 'concepts rather
than particular 'conceptions']." Perry, Interpretivism, supra note 54, at 29S. For criticism of this
distinction on the ground that "a large number of different overarching theories would be
consistent with the moral or political principles specified in the text," see Schauer, supra note
128, at (forthcoming).
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ability of apparently open-ended provisions, and the self-validating
quality of judicial elaboration of a constitutional phrase, the delegation theory, at least when stated in this strong form, 56 cannot responsibly be taken very far. In positing that a strong, open-ended delegation was intended, the theory assumes its central conclusion.
Moreover, it surely cannot be used to reach a result contrary to the
Framers' specific and known intent, which, Berger contends, is pre57
cisely the way in which it has been used.1
The delegation theory, at least for many commentators, is simply
a mask for eliminating entirely the constraints of original intent. 15 8
Professor Cover is among those who would drop that mask:
If the Supreme Court ought to labor under the constraint of the
framers' specific intentions it is because we and our progeny will
find it useful that the justices be constrained in that way. In other
words this reading of the Constitution must stand or fall not upon
the Constitution's self-evident meaning, nor upon the intentions of
1787 or 1866 framers. It constitutes a judgment about our own
political present and future and about alternative theories of judicial activity which will best serve it. The ultimate and only justification for the constitutional government we have is that it will
secure to us and our posterity the blessings of liberty-not that it
was intended by the framers to bind us.15 9
Stated in these terms, Professor Cover's argument is incomplete. No
explanation at all is provided for the binding quality of any constitutional provision, including the requirement that the president be

'5
For a milder version of the delegation theory, see J. Ely, supra note 20, ch. 2. Ely argues
that the privileges or immunities clause and the ninth amendment are "delegation[s to future
constitutional decision-makers to protect certain rights that the document [does not listI."
Id. at
28, 38. I say that Ely's version is "milder" because he would confine these rights to those that are
"representation-reinforcing," and because he attributes that open-ended character to those

clauses which at least linguistically bear the construction. See note 61 supra.
157 R. Berger, supra note 63, at 117-56; see Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, supra
note 13, at 121-22. Professor Brest, however, is unwilling to concede even this. See Brest,
Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 216 ("The adopters may have understood that, even as to
instances to which they believe the clause ought or ought not to apply, further thought by
themselves or others committed to its underlying principle might lead them to change their
minds.")
'" See Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in Constitutional Interpretation, 6 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 487, 490, 496-98 (1979) ("bootless and usually fruitless quest for the intentions of
those who drafted the document"); C. Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 3 (1947) (the Framers
"may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs"), cited In
Wofford, supra note 125, at 509.
'-1 Cover, Book Review, New Republic, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26-27; see Monaghan, The Constitution at Harvard, supra note 13, at 122-23 & n.28.
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thirty-five years old. Presumably, any provision can be disregarded if
it "will [not] secure to us and our posterity the blessings of liberty."
And who is empowered to make such a determination? The supreme
court, or the political branches of government? Statements such as
that of Professor Cover fail to provide a satisfactory general account of
constitutional law and, more specifically, of the institution of judicial
review itself. Nor are such statements in the slightest way helpful with
respect to specific issues, such as those raised by the abortion cases. "
They imply deeper theories about the nature of constitutional law,
but they do not openly avow them.
2. Professor Brest
Professor Brest stands virtually alone among current commentators in attempting to provide a complete theory for disregarding original intent. His general argument is that constitutional theory should
accord authoritative status to tradition that "supplements or derogates
from the text."'1 61 In developing this argument, Professor Brest advances both descriptive and normative challenges to any theory assigning interpretative primacy to original intent (or to the text itself, if
one thinks that different).
Professor Brest argues first that, however formulated, 0 2 original
intent theory requires rejection of much of the corpus of modem
constitutional law, including the decisions fastening the bill of rights
on the states, 6 3 Griswold,64 Roe v. Wade, 65 and other judicial land10 E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (19S0);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1978); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"I Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 225; see text accompanying notes 91-95
supra. That tradition evolves from what Brest calls "(mere) adjudication," Id. at 224, the
common law method of deriving "legal principles from custom, social practices, conventional
morality, and precedent," id.at 228-29. See generally Sandalow, supra note 48, at 1041-55
(summarizing decisions shaping constitutional law to contemporary values).
1'2 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 205-24 (originalist interpretation based on
text, intentions, or structure).
163 Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (8th Cir.) (excessive bail), prob. juris. noted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-2165); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796
(1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (jury trial in criminal
actions); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (compulsory process clause); Klopter v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 3S0 U.S. 400, 403
(1965) (confrontation clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (freedom from self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655-57 (1961) (exclusionary rule); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-73 (1948) (public trial);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (establishment and free exercise clauses);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech and press); Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (taldng clause).
'"
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'6 410 U.S. 113 (1973). I do not charge Brest with a defense of this decision.
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marks. 166 No theory can be sound, Professor Brest argues, that fails to
account for so much of the data that it is called upon to explain. Nor
can it be sound if it implies the massive destabilization that would
occur from overruling an important part of our constitutional jurisprudence.167
I accept as a premise that the illustrations cited are not consistent
with original intent. Professor Brest's initial position is thus formidable. The expectations so long generated by this body of constitutional
law render unacceptable a full return to original intent theory in any
pure, unalloyed form. While original intent may constitute the starting point for constitutional interpretation, it cannot now be recognized as the only legitimate mode of constitutional reasoning. To my
mind, some theory of stare decisis is necessary to confine its reach. 08
Of course, this is to accord an authoritative status to tradition in
"supplementing or derogating from" the constitutional text, at least if
that "tradition" has worked its way into judicial opinions. 10 But a
stare decisis theory has its limits, at least for those who take original
intent seriously. Stare decisis would, perhaps, perpetuate the core of
the court's nontextually based holdings: the privacy-autonomyequality holdings in the sex-marriage-children area. 170 But this concession to reality would not be taken to entail, also in the name of
reality, the further concession that our constitutional law now sanctions the general, nontextual mode of constitutional analysis advocated by Professor Brest, one which in other hands will protect "personal life styles," "personhood," the "right of intimate association," or
what have you.1"1 One cannot squeeze that much out of the existing

precedents. Professor Tribe is surely wrong in asserting that "[i]f the
decisional cornerstones of the past are to be preserved, does not principled adjudication force also a preservation of the open-ended modes
of interpretation that such decisions inescapably embodied?"' 7 2 Apart

"I See Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 223-24. See also Grey, supra note 132, at
710-12; R. Berger, supra note 63, at 411-12.
"' Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 231. Brest also argues that original Intent
theory is always somewhat unstable because "settled constitutional understanding Is In perpetual
jeopardy of being overturned by new light on the adopters' intent." Id.
168On the need for and the difficulty of formulating such a theory, see Monaghan, Court
Opinions, supra note 53, at 7-12.
169
Professor Brest addresses this "qualified version of originalism" that accords respect to stare
decisis in a single, obscure footnote. Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 232 n.108.
170 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
171

See notes 7-9 supra.

172

L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 2 (Supp. 1979).
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from the now discredited Lochner173 line of cases, how many decisions openly avow "open-ended modes of interpretation"? In virtually
every instance, the court has made an effort-often strained, to be
sure- to find an acceptable textual home for its results, and thereby
to disclaim any such general authority.'7 4 The court is, no doubt,
now becoming bolder.1' 5 But in the face of the current explicit
challenges to the court's authority to proceed in such an "open-ended"
fashion, commentators surely cannot yet invoke stare decisis as having
established the propriety of the very authority the court has so persist176
ently denied.
Professor Brest does not rely solely upon the failure of original
intent theory to account descriptively for much modern constitutional
law. He advances other, even sharper challenges to the asserted primacy of original intent. Why, he asks, should the constitutional text
be authoritative at all for successor generations? 77 It is, I recognize,
logically possible to maintain some ground other than the written
constitution as the first principle in constitutional theorizing; but I
simply find this argument to be a barren one. The authoritative status
of the written constitution is a legitimate matter of debate for political
theorists interested in the nature of political obligation. 7 8 That status
is,. however, an incontestable first principle for theorizing about
American constitutional law. That I cannot otherwise "prove" the
constitutional text to be the first principle is a necessary outcome of
my first principle itself. As Aristotle long ago said:
Some thinkers demand a demonstration even of this principle but
they do so because they lack education; for it is a lack of education

'7
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state law limiting work week to 60
hours), a decision "now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally Improper," J.
Ely, supra note 20, at 14. But see Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1066 n.9 (1980).
174 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (privacy as a penumbra
formed by emanations from the bill of rights); note 132 supra.
1,5 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-06 (1977) (substantive due process
defended, and an effort made to distinguish between "good" and "bad" varieties).
Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 7.
'
Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 225. ("We did not adopt the Constitution,
and those who did are dead and gone."). This point is made even with respect to officials who
take oaths to support the constitution. Id. at 225 n.80; see note 94 supra. It is, of course, a
bootstrap argument to respond, as does Raoul Berger, that the Framers (or eminent commentators) believed that the original intent mode is required. See R. Berger, supra note 63, at 363-72;
note 135 supra.
17 See the recent Symposium in honor of A.D. Voozley: Law and Obedience, 67 Va. L. Rev.
1 (1981). For a concise summary of the problem, see Macde, Obligations to Obey the Law, 67
Va. L. Rev. 143, 144-51 (1981).
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to know of what things one could seek a demonstration and of what
he should not. For, as a whole, a demonstration of everything is
impossible; for the process would go on to infinity,
so that even in
1 79
this manner there would be no demonstration.
For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the constitutional text is itself incapable of and not in need of further demonstration. It is our master rule of recognition, 180 one initially so intended and understood 18 and one which our "tradition" in fact
continues to perpetuate.
Moreover, Professor Brest's attack on the authoritative character
of the constitutional text is, even on its own terms, weakened by a
laconically made but important footnote conceding that "recent" constitutional amendments can overturn principles derived from tradition.18 2 Such a concession is necessary, Brest says, "[b]ecause of the
centrality of the democratic ideal and the importance of external
checks on judicial decisionmaking." 8 3 The second reason, the need
for external checks on judicial control, seems to me to be entirely
dependent upon the first, namely, "the centrality of the democratic
ideal." But, of course, the new amendment itself is subject to corrosion by time-by Brest's tradition. Why, then, at any given pointsome undefined period following an amendment-are the people
deemed more qualified than the judges to heed Professor Brest's central criterion of constitutional legitimacy: "does the practice contribute to the well-being of our society -or more narrowly to the ends of
constitutional government"? 1184 Why, specifically, should the people
for some limited period of time enjoy a numerical override of judicial
decisions protecting "individual rights,"' 85 one of Brest's constitutional "ends"? Brest is, in fact, able to subordinate judicial protection
of individual liberties to the weight of numbers only because he
postulates several "ends of (ours? or any?) constitutional government"

'" Aristotle, Metaphysics 1006a(5)-(10) (Apostle trans. 1966). Artistotle goes on to argue that

at this level of inquiry one can only demonstrate by refutation. Id. 1006a(12)-(29). See also

Id.

1061(b) ((34) 1062b(11)).
'o See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 92-93, 97-103, 112-14, 141-42 (1981). But see
Commentary, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 525, 537 (1981) (remarks of Prof. Dworkin).
"I See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9

Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); B. Bailyn, Tho Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution 175-98 (1967); G. Wood, The Creation of the Amorican
Republic, 1776-1789, at 273-82, 336-44 (1969).
182 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 229 n.94.
183 Id.
'1

Id. at 226.

185Id.
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and in such an indefinite way that they do not admit of any ordering
186
principle.
Even were the attack on the authoritative character of the constitutional text more persuasive, the question remains whether Brest has
established his affirmative case for treating tradition as authoritatively superior to the document. With characteristic modesty, he
backs away from such a stark submission, stating simply that the
claims of "[mere] adjudication"' 8 7 are as plausible as those of original
intent theory.1 88 But support for his view is, I think, lacking. One of
two arguments is available. First, one could argue that tradition has
achieved a sort of popular ratification through the ongoing public
acceptance of "anti-originalist" doctrine. Second, one could abandon
popular consent as a legitimizing device altogether in favor of some
other source of legitimacy.
The force of the first position seems to me substantially diminished by the court's purported reliance on original intent. 8 9 Professor
Brest, therefore, asserts a second, more audacious proposition: "actual
consent is not ... a practicable measure of the legitimacy of any
system of government, and a fortiori not of a particular practice or
particular institution."' 9 0 To abandon popular consent as the foundation of the practice of major governmental institutions is most
troublesome.' 9' But my major concern here is with its replacement.
Brest offers the following five "designedly vague" criteria as the touchstone for constitutional decisionmaking:
Among other things, the [decision] should (1) foster democratic
government; (2) protect individuals against arbitrary, unfair, and
intrusive official action; (3) conduce to a political order that is
'

See text accompanying notes 191-94 infra.

'7 Brest,

Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 224; see note 161 supra.

"IsId. at 224, 228 n.92.
189See text accompanying noted 132434 supra.
10 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49,

at 226; see Brest, The Fundamental Rights
Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale
L.J. 1063, 1101-02 (1981). Professor Brest acknowledges that institutional competence alone
might validate an institution's claim of authority. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1979 TermForeword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1980). This argument Is not appealing
with respect to the role played by the major organs of governmental authority.
19 Absolute refutation of Professor Brest's position is of course impossible, since first premises
are open to selection. All I can offer is a different starting point: given a basic premise that the
constitutional text is authoritative, the existence of some extraconstitutional tradition cannot be
treated as self-validating. In the end we are presented with the problem currently faced by
English constitutional theorists: short of an actual revolution, how does one shift fundamental
constitutional norms? See text accompanying note 126 supra. One might be inclined to say that
in the American system such a shift can be accomplished only by constitutional amendment. But
that position is not open to me given my belief that some decisions inconsistent with original
intent are protected by stare decisis. See text accompanying notes 168-76 supra.
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relatively stable but which also responds to changing conditions,
values, and needs; (4) not readily lend itself to arbitrary
decisions
92
or abuses; and (5) be acceptable to the populace.
Now these desiderata simply cannot be the touchstone for constitutional decisionmaking. They are tossed together in a way that admits of no ordering of priorities among them. Moreover, taken individually they are inadequate. The first criterion is harmless enough;
indeed, it is a recapitulation of Professor Ely's position. But the second
criterion is an open-ended license to the court to proscribe all official
conduct which the court intensely dislikes. The third criterion is
empty of guidance. The fourth criterion mocks itself; like the second,
it is so vague that it could not help but produce arbitrary decisions.
And the fifth could not be less suited to the business of courts, which
of all the institutions of governments are the least capable of divining
what is acceptable to the populace.1 3 The problem, it seems to me,
is that the making of constitutional law simply ought not be like the
making of common law.' 9 4 Professor Brest's standards may be Solomonic advice to common law courts, but in constitutional cases the
federal courts are not common law courts. It is axiomatic that the
federal power is a limited one, and what it is limited to has for two
hundred years been something that passes as "interpretation" of the
constitution. To abandon that jurisprudence for the sake of freeing us
from the constraints of original intent is to kill a small bird with a
rather large cannon.
From my perspective, Professor Brest has not provided a satisfactory foundation for treating tradition as possessing an authority superior to the text. 95 Moreover, his formulation is ambiguous. Does
112

Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 226.

03 The appeal to popular consensus makes especially little sense in the constitutional area. See
J. Ely, supra note 20, at 67-68:
An appeal to consensus... may make some sense in a "common law" context, where the
court is either filling in the gaps left by the legislature .. or, perhaps, responding to a
broad legislative delegation of decision-making authority. Since they are "standing In" for
the legislature, courts presumably should try to behave as (good) legislatures behave ....
The problem is that the constitutional context is worlds away: the legislature has spoken,
and the question is whether the court is to overrule it ....
'0
See the more general attack on the common law method in the constitutional field In text
accompanying notes 218-35 infra.
I" I myself do not abandon the jurisprudence of original intent by acknowledging that some
decisions inconsistent with original intent are protected by stare decisis. See text accompanying
notes 168-76 supra. There are material differences between these decisions and an extraconstitu.
tional tradition that has not worked its way into judicial opinions. Courts are entrusted with the
function of defining the meaning of the constitution, and their "mistakes" in interpreting original
intent might be said to be an inherent risk of our constitutional structure. Moreover, these
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tradition refer to the content of the extraconstitutional norms or only
to their existence? In other words, assuming that tradition establishes
that extraconstitutional norms should be employed, what is their
source? That the source should be the actual traditions of the American people is a position difficult to defend after the severe methodological and normative attacks advanced by Ely. 6 Can one discard
that tradition and instead reason about "what it means to be a person"
and the denial of "a meaningful opportunity to realize [one's] humanity," as Professor Tribe contends?1 97 It is hard to believe that such
indefinite concepts could be legitimately used by courts to constrain
the political process.19 8
Professor Brest's trouble with original intent theory rests on a
familiar foundation. If one took seriously original intent as a constraining influence on constitutional interpretation, the document's
9
imperfect quality is readily apparent, as Professor Brest recognizes.
Original intent theory, taken seriously, undermines the objectives of
the perfectionist.
B. Stare Decisis
That stare decisis is a moribund mode of constitutional interpretation is no secret to court watchers.200 The perfectionist theory,
however, is not the sole (or even principal) explanation for the waning

mistakes are acted upon by all other organs of government, and have, at least in bulk, enough
clarity so that some measure of popular acquiescence (if not consent) may be assumed. Bresfs
tradition is in fact removed from this; his is one assiduously denied by the court when it places
emphasis on original intent. Moreover, every addition to Brest's tradition cuts against the core
institutional structure created by our constitution-representative democracy. Given that structure, I do not see how one can maintain the existence of a generaljudicial license to depart from
the constitutional text, "to supplement or derogate from it."
I" See J. Ely, supra note 20, ch. 2.
197 Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J.
1063, 1077 (1980).
198 See R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics 241 (1975):
[AIU the many attempts to build a moral and political doctrine upon the conception of a
universal human nature have failed. [The theorists] are repeatedly trapped in a dilemma.
Either the allegedly universal ends are too few and abstract to give content to the idea of
the good or they are too numerous and concrete to be truly universal.
'
Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 229 ("The Constitution reflects a pragmatic
and not always principled compromise among a variety of regional, economic and political
interests.").
m See Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 19S0 Wis.
L. Rev. 467, 494-96 (listing cases in which the supreme court overruled itself on constitutional
issues from 1960 to 1979).
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influence of stare decisis; 2 0 1 the doctrine also carries very little real
202
justificatory force even in the common law area that spawned it.
The general decay of stare decisis reflects more than the need of a
rapidly changing society for new accommodating principles. It is the
manifestation in legal thought of the marked, accelerating, and apparently irreversible decline in the belief of permanent ordering in
any field of thought, a development that has been in "progress" since
the seventeenth century. 0 3 Thus, on any currently "important" issue
the content of the common law will have to be "argued for";2 04 appeal
to the justification of prior authority will count for very little. Indeed,
in the common law area, stare decisis demands little more than "an
expository style or technique,"2 0 5 one which" 'impels a court, so far as
practicable, to place the situations they are judging within the generalized class of some existing decision.' "206
The declining relevance of stare decisis is even more dramatic in
constitutional cases. The court has repeatedly proclaimed that the
common law doctrine's supposed constraints should have only "limited application in the field of constitutional law"20 7 -a euphemism
201This is evidenced by the difficulty encountered by some original intent canonists In
recognizing the claims of stare decisis. See R. Berger, supra note 63, at 412-14 ("It would,
however, be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past in the face of the
expectations that the segregation decisions, for example, have aroused in our black citizenry.... That is more than the courts should undertake and more, I believe, than the
American people would desire."). It is also evidenced by the efforts of some perfectionists to use
the concept against their critics. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1-2 (Supp. 1979)
(self-defeating nature of any insistence upon stare decisis).
202 See Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 5-7. I am of course speaking of the
doctrine as it affects courts of last resort considering their own precedents, not Inferior courts
considering the precedents of hierarchically superior tribunals.
203 See F. Baumer, Modem European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950
(1977).
2' See Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of
Law, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 441 (1978) (emphasis omitted) (citing L. Fuller, The Law In Quest
of Itself 110-17 (1940)).
20 Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 6.
2
Id. (quoting Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrechtin Amerika,
33 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 212 (1933)). The doctrine, as currently understood, permits the nonprecedent court to rationalize the earlier precedents almost without limit. And what cannot be
rerationalized is simply disregarded. Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 5-6.
m St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (Stone & Cardozo, J.
J., concurring); see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action Is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the Judicial
function.
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for "no application" if the matter impresses the court as one that
should be set right. The lack of concern for precedent in constitutional
law is demonstrated by more than the ease with which constitutional
decisions are overruled.2 08 It is evident in the fast and loose way in
which the court all too frequently plays with its prior cases.2-°9

The reasons advanced for heavily discounting precedent as a
constraining influence in constitutional adjudication are not satisfying.210 The most insistently pressed justification is that "correction
through legislative action is practically impossible."211
The undifferentiating character of this "need" argument is readily apparent: it
fails to make any distinction among constitutional provisions, some of
which are plainly less important in a realistic sense than others;2 12 and
in every case it sacrifices the long-run values of stability and predictability necessary for ordering our most fundamental affairs. Most
importantly, its central factual assumption is patently false, at least
regarding the decisions to which the commentators are most anxious
to deny binding authority-those rejecting autonomy or equality
claims.2 13 Such decisions can be overruled by statute in almost every
See generally Boudin, The Problem of StareDecisis in Our Constitutional Theory, 8N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 589 (1931); Ellenbogen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should
Be Applied, 20 Temp. L.Q. 503, 506-12 (1947).
2'11See Bloustein & Field, "Overruling' Decisions in the Supreme Court, 57 Mich. L. Rev.
151, 167 (1958) (60 of the court's 90 overrulings before 1958 in the constitutional law area);
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 743, 757-58 (1949) (listing thirty cases overruled
between 1937 and 1949).
2 Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 2-3 & nn.4-5; Stone, The Miranda Doctrine
in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 169 ("In its unyielding determination to reach the
desired result, the Court has too often resorted to distortion of the record, disregard of precedent,
and an unwillingness honestly to explain or to justify its conclusion.").
210 The question-begging nature is clear in the assertion that the only correct rule of decision is
"the Constitution itself and not what we [the Court] have said about it." Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring). Moreover, the same
argument could be, but is not generally, applied to questions of statutory interpretation.
"IThomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (19S0) (plurlity opinion)
(quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissentIng)); see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ("In constitutional questions, where
correction depends upon amendment and not legislative action[,] this court throughout its
history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of Its constitutional decisions.").
212 Monaghan, Court Opinions, supra note 53, at 4 n.1O ("decisions construing the seventh
amendments right to trial by jury, as well as the many decisions interpreting the double
jeopardy clause [,] lack the social importance necessary to justify a departure from stare dec!sis....).
213E.g., Parham v. J.L., 442 U.S. 584, 598-617 (1979) (formal adversary hearing; not
required when parents seek to commit their children to state mental institutions); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 470-80 (1977) (state's choice not to pay for nontherapeutic abortions does not
violate constitution); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977) (upholding constitutionality
of statute authorizing state to record in computer file names and addresses of patients obtaining
prescriptions for certain dangerous but legitimate drugs).
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instance. Were the court to sustain, as against the fourteenth amendment attack, discrimination against women or illegitimates, nothing
prevents the states from passing corrective legislation to secure the
claimed rights. Congress possesses similar competence by virtue of its
regulatory authority under the commerce clause214 and the fourteenth
amendment, 215 to say nothing of its power to compel adherence to
nationally formulated norms through conditions attached to national
grants. 216 In fact, much civil rights law is statutory in character, and
the statutes impose norms that the constitution standing alone does
not require.
The rejection of stare decisis as a justificatory doctrine in constitutional law is not complete, of course. Important and controversial
civil liberties cases are still decided on the basis of prior authority and,
perhaps, gain acceptance for the result on that basis.2 1 7 But that fact
further diminishes the appeal of decisions resting on stare decisis,
leaving the doctrine with the predictability of a lightning bolt: it will
strike on occasion, but when and where can only be known after the
fact.
I cannot proffer, even tentatively, a theory of stare decisis in
constitutional law. But my purpose in this article is satisfied by showing that its currently disfavored status is strongly reinforced by the
fundamental premises of perfectionist theory. The perfectionists' recognition of the constraining influence of stare decisis in constitutional
adjudication conjures up images of the dead hand of the past, not that
of a "living" or "relevant" constitution. Perfectionism requires the

21 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
3; see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-305 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-62 (1964) (upholding constitutionality of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
21 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-56 (1966) (upholding § 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 forbidding a voter qualification requirement of English literacy for persons
completing the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school; in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the Court had refused to strike down such literacy tests on their
face.). See generally Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1228-42 (1978).
216 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 479-80 (1980) (10% of federal funds granted for
public works projects must be used to procure goods from businesses owned by minority group
members); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974) (Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964
excludes from participation in federal financial assistance recipients that discriminate on grounds
of race, color, or national origin).
217 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980) (holding, on basis of Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), that state participating in Medicaid program not obligated under
Social Security Act to continue to fund medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursements unavailable); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977) (refusing on grounds
of stare decisis to presume that state-supported educational materials for private schools would
not be used for religious purposes).
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continuous reformulation of the minimum ideal norms of the polity,
and the continuous application of the norms to varying circumstances.
Legislation may (and given the current explosion of civil rights enactments, frequently does) embody those norms. Yet, a current schedule
of extraconstitutional norms is always "necessary" for a proper assessment and constraint of the workings of the political process. Otherwise, the constitution might begin to show the hallmarks of a lessthan-perfect document.
C. The Common Law Mode of Adjudication
The perfectionists' discomfort with interpretative modes
grounded in original intent and precedent is offset by their enthusiasm
for viewing constitutional law as similar in method and substance to
the common law of torts.218 Thus, Professor Brest proposes to derive
and elaborate constitutional principles from "custom, social practices,
conventional morality, and precedents."219
Other commentators rely
more explicitly on insights derived from currently fashionable philosophical or economic concepts to generate both common law and
constitutional principles. 2 0 Application of common law approaches
to the constitutional law area has important consequences for interpretation. First, it invites the extraction of quite general political
principles from the specific constitutional guarantees.2' Second, and
more important, the common law method encourages the elaboration
of supplemental, nontextually grounded principles of political morality to fill in any gaps. So supplemented, the constitution manifests a
unified, coherent conception of political justice, and not simply a
series of separate and incompletely related provisions which, taken
together, axe insufficiently expressive of the substantive values of a
twentieth-century liberal democracy.

218 The description that follows draws from the intellectual history of American tort law as it
has developed in this century. See G. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History ch. 7
(1980).
219 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 228-29; see note 161 supra.
210 E.g., B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 182-83 (1977) ("Ordinary
observing" amenable to Rawlsian, Benthamite or pareto-optimal approaches to evaluation of
legal rules); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously cl. 5 (building on Rawls concept-conception
distinction); id. ch. 9 (building on Mill's internal-external preference distinction) (19Th); R.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 491-551 (2d ed. 1977).
221 As Professor Posner observes, the mode of analysis "treats individual ..
constitutional
provisions much like individual cases in a field of common law: from a study of the provisions, as
of ases, the judge extracts some ruling principle that can be used to decide a new, previously
unforeseen case." Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 173, 196 n.63.
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The common law approach is particularly congenial to professors
of law, whose training and experience heavily emphasize this technique. The advantages of transplanting the common law method to
the constitutional arena are obvious. The tedious labor associated
with the historical search for original intent is eliminated. With the
concerns of the past out'of the way, attention may be focused exclusively on present realities. Armed with the insights of current social,
political, and economic thinking, 222 these commentators can "reason"
about contemporary needs and the public good in much the same way
that they would reason about tort problems -with interest balancing
providing the solution to every constitutional problem, just as it purports to do for the creative common law judge. The constitutional
values themselves become one set of interests -important ones to be
sure, but in the end only interests -to be weighed against competing
social values.
Our constitutional origins suggest a different perspective: the
constitution as a superstatute. 223 Like important statutes, the constitution emerged as a result of compromises struck after hard bargaining.2 24 In addition, its intellectual underpinnings225 invite a statutory
perspective. The dominant conceptions of popular sovereignty and
limited government realized by the device of a social compact suggest
that the constitution be construed as a compact whose contents could
not be altered by any organ of government. That is a great deal more
like the way statutes are construed than the way common law is
made. These origins make plausible, even if they do not compel, a
conclusion that constitutional interpretation should be assimilated to
the process of statutory interpretation. While I do not wish to overstate the differences between common law development and statutory
interpretation, 226 important interpretational consequences do flow
from viewing the constitution as a statute (a super one, to be sure)
rather than as declaration of common law. Statutory interpretation
involves a blend of emphases upon original intention and historical

'2 Insights not held by all in equal esteem. See Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of
Equality, 1979 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 5 ("those in [legal] academia ... make claims to greater

insights about the social condition than even the greatest of philosophers, economists, sociologists, and political theorists").
2" For exploration of this view in a somewhat different framework, see Michelman, Constltu
tions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. Legal Stud. 431, 443-53 (1980).

See M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 201 (1913) (a
"bundle of compromises").
225 See

G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 273-91 (1969).

20 See Westen & Lehman, Is There Life For Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 Mich. L.

Rev. 311, 332-36, 375-76 (1980).
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context, and a full recognition of the unprincipled, and imperfect,
nature of an enactment produced by compromise. 2 7 By contrast, the
common law method, if applied to either a statute or a constitution,
tends to obscure the compromise character of the enactment, and thus
renders opaque its "imperfect" quality when measured against ideal
norms.
Candor requires that one recognize that the common law approach, and not the statutory approach, best describes the development of constitutional law under the bill of rights.2- 8 Substantive
elaboration of the bill of rights has increasingly followed the incremental, case-by-case method employed by common law judges.
Viewed retrospectively, this was perhaps inevitable. 9 Courts have
had to cope with the relative paucity and indeterminacy of the underlying historical materials, as well as the difficulty of relating ancient
norms to a world radically different from that of the Framers. Not
surprisingly, as the text got older and interpretative materials accumulated, "the focus of professional and judicial attention ...
[shifted] from the ... text and history to the ... norm[s] to be
derived by analysis and synthesis of the judicial precedents.2 0 More
importantly, adoption of the method of the common law, with its
emphasis on precedent (albeit without the constraining influence of
stare decisis) and analogical reasoning, brought with it a belief that
the substance of the judicial task in each sphere is similar: balancing
the interests at stake, with the constitutional guarantees assessed in
functional, rather than historical, terms.231 At least in bill of rights
127 See J. Ely, supra note 20, at 3 (Were a judge interpreting a statute "to announce ...
, In
the name of the statute in question, those fundamental values he believed America had always
stood for, we... might even consider a call to the lunacy commission."); H. Hart & A. Sacks,
The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1144.47, 1410-17
(tent. ed. 1958).
228 The common law method is especially noticeable for those provisions with solid common
law underpinnings. See notes 58-59 supra; cf. Jones, The Common Law in the United States:
English Themes and American Variations, in Political Separation and Legal Continuity 91, 134
(H. Jones ed. 1976) (not self-evident in 1789 that judges should use same techniques in construction of constitutional provisions as in interpretation of statutory and decisional sources).
229 Judge Learned Hand once argued that, viewed as an original matter, the bill of rights was
too indeterminate in content to be judicially enforced as limitations on the political organs. L.
Hand, The Bill of Rights 34, 55 (1958). The common lav method fleshes out these provisions
over time.
Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of Constitutional Law, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1979).
23 The perfectionist could insist that this is as it should be, for the hard bargaining related to
the original document centered upon matters of structure and design, not the bill of rights. See
M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 91-112 (1913). Thus, no
justification appears for taking the grudging, narrow approach to their meaning all too frequently characteristic of statutory construction, particularly given the plainly intractable nature
of the problem of generally determining which constitutional provisions were bargained over
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cases, therefore, there is considerable force in Professor Brest's observation that reliance upon original intent "has played a very small role
compared to the elaboration of the Court's own precedents. It is
rather like having a remote ancestor who came over on the May'2 32
flower."
Thus, the perfectionist has much on which to rely in drawing
upon a common law approach to the development of civil libertiesbut not nearly enough to justify the perfectionists' central need to
legitimate the existence of a supplemental, nontextually based list of
autonomy, privacy, and equality claims that are assertable against the
political organs of government. One could, after all, argue that elaboration of the specific guarantees of the bill of rights exhibits characteristics of both common law and statutory interpretation: common law
because their content is worked out in the manner of the analogical
and precedential reasoning characteristic of the common law courts;
statutory because, so far as is practicable, emphasis has been and still
should be placed on historical setting and original intent. A supplemental list of nontextual rights lacks the latter characteristics by definition.
More importantly, the bill of rights should constitute the paradigmatic illustration of the American reluctance to reason from the
equity of the statute. 233 That the constitution specifically guarantees
the enumerated freedoms of the bill of rights does not, stated alone,
imply that it guarantees a list of unstated freedoms such as the rights
of "intimate association" and "personhood." The validity of any such
approach is entirely dependent upon a showing that constitutional

and which were not. See Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient
Adjudication, 9 J. Legal Stud. 431, 443-53 (1980).
232Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 49, at 234. I have elsewhere suggested that the court
not only could, but should, proceed as a common law court in the area of the textually
enumerated civil liberties and develop a true common law of civil liberties, one wholly reversible
by Congress. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10-11, 44-45 (1975). But see Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1133-35 (1978), criticizing this theory,
inter alia, on original intent grounds.
23 There is, I recognize, a strong argument that the "equity of a statute," whatever Its limits,
can also provide an independent source for elaborating further common law principles. See
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 218-19 (1934); Schaefer,
Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 18-22 (1966); Stone, The Common Law In the
United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-14 (1936). But see Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 403-04 (1908). See also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law
Orbits, 17 Cath. U.L. Rev. 401 (1968). However, this argument is not applicable to the
constitution. The development of common law is an inherent judicial power stemming from the
necessity to provide a decision for the case at hand. It is, however, subordinate to and subject to
the control of ordinary legislative enactments. See Landis, supra, at 233.
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text authorizes it. Only the ninth amendment and the privileges or
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment could provide a basis
for such guarantees, a contention that I have already indicated is
arguable but unpersuasive.2 34 Perfectionist autonomy, privacy, and
equality rights are different in kind from the process rights explicitly
guaranteed by the constitutional text, as Professor Ely shows. 'a - Moreover, the substantive rights now asserted by the perfectionists, were
wholly foreign to both eighteenth and nineteenth century constitutional jurisprudence. Perfectionists cannot point to a textual authorization for their views without demonstrating that the ninth amendment and the privileges or immunities clause were intended to possess
a strong, dynamic component, one that would authorize courts to
enlarge materially over time the sphere insulated from the reach of
the ordinary political process. Thus, even if both the form and the
substance of common law method are properly utilized by the court in
the development of "specific" constitutional guarantees, a general
judicial prerogative to constrain the outcomes of an open and fair
political process cannot be supported.
IV
OUR "IMPERFECT"

CONSTITUTION

The "antidemocratic" charge levelled against the constitution by
progressivist historians2 36 has always struck me as unconvincing.
Viewed in its historical setting, the original document was remarkably
"democratic." 2 3 7 Moreover, the amendments-ignored by these
critics-present in their entirety a consistently democratic theme, one
that made the constitution "a far more democratic document than the
one [we] inherited from [the Framers].."2 3B Both in origin and line of
growth, therefore, the constitution of the United States deserves the
appellation "democratic." The constitution established a framework
of government suitable to meet the middle distance needs of the
nation at the end of the eighteenth century and, with the Civil War
amendments, the nation's needs at the turn of the twentieth century.
Perhaps, although I am less sure, the governmental framework is even
adequate to meet the general needs of our times. But the constitution
2

See text accompanying notes 80-88 supra.

23 J. Ely, supra note 20, cs. 3-4. But see Lynch, Book Review, S0 Colum. L. Rev. 857,
860-61 (1980) (not clear constitution concerned primarily with process rights). See generally

Laycoek, supra note 88.
23 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
237 R. Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians 252-63, 273-75, 280-84 (196S).

m A. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution xi (1978).
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is not "perfect" in the sense we have been considering. If original
intent be our guide, the constitution did not authorize judges to
insulate from the political process most of the individual rights asserted in current conceptions of political morality.
This is not to say that our constitution sacrificed any concern for
political justice. The important point is that the constitution is flexible
enough to permit the political organs of the government to advance a
large and expanding range of equality and autonomy claims. I part
company, however, with those who believe the constitution mandates
protection of such claims, including, for example, the "right" of vendors to sell contraceptives to minors.2 39 I simply do not understand
how such judicial activism can be reconciled with the original intent
of the Framers of either the 1789-1791 text or 1868-1870 amendments.
To be sure, the constitution embodies an ideology, but it is a limited
one. As Dean Casper observes, "there have been historical developments [in American society] to which the Constitution had very few
ideas to contribute; for example, the revolutionary changes in the
structure and regulation of the American economy."2 40 Similarly, the
constitution has "very few ideas to contribute" to the social equality,
privacy, and autonomy claims now pressed by perfectionist commentators. The ideology contained in the constitution is significantly less
embracing in scope than the ideology of the American way of life at
the end of the twentieth century. It is, therefore, fundamentally
wrong to believe that one can ascertain the meaning of the constitu241
tion by asking: "Is this what America stands for? '
My review of the various efforts made by perfectionist commentators to overcome the discrepancy between the ideology fairly ascribable to the constitution and that dominant in our nearly twenty-first
century, postindustrial liberal democracy leaves me with a conviction
that those efforts are seriously flawed. The perfectionism of our constitution, if it has that quality, inheres in its guarantee of an open and
fairly structured political process. Perhaps that is enough. Perhaps as
"a charter of government a constitution must prescribe legitimate
processes, not legitimate outcomes, if like ours (and unlike more ideological documents elsewhere) it is to serve many generations through
changing times. '2 42 In short, perhaps the constitution guarantees
only representative democracy, not perfect government.
'3' Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

240 Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 So. Cal. L. Rev. 773, 778-79 (1980).

14I It is,of course, a separate question whether such judicial activism is reconcilable with the
premises of a political democracy. See Monaghan, Book Review, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 308-11

(1980).

242 Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 254 (1976).
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